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Macroeconomics, or the science of fluctuations in aggregate activity, has always been portrayed as a 
field composed of competing schools of thought and in a somewhat recurrent state of disarray. 
Nowadays, macroeconomists are proud to announce that a new synthesis characterizes their field: 
no longer are there fights and disarray, but rather convergence and progress. I want to discuss how 
modern macroeconomists see the emergence of such a consensus and, therefore, how they see the 
history  of  their  sub-discipline.  In  particular,  I  stress  the  role  played  in  the  making  of  such  a 
consensus by a particular understanding of the microfoundations that macroeconomics needs.  
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Macroeconomics is now, as it has always been, the 
subject of intense controversy.             Robert Solow (1979, 340) 
 
When  the  outside  world  tells  us  that  no  two 
economists ever agree on anything, it is talking about macroeconomics. 
Stanley Fischer (1983, 275) 
 
While  macroeconomics  is  often  thought  of  as  a 
deeply  divided  field,  with  less  of  a  shared  core  and  correspondingly  less 
cumulative  progress  than  in  other  areas  of  economics,  in  fact,  there  are 
fewer fundamental disagreements among macroeconomists now than in the 
past  decades.  This  is  due  to  important  progress  in  resolving  seemingly 
intractable debates.      Michael Woodford (2009, 267) 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
According to the economists discussed in this essay, macroeconomics here refers to “the 
branch of economics concerned with fluctuations in the overall level of business activity, with the 
determinants of inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates, and with the effects of government 
policies…that are considered mainly with regard to their effects upon the economy as a whole” 
(Woodford  2000,  1).  Therefore,  the  focus  is  on  business  cycles  and  the  theory  of  economic 
stabilization (with greater emphasis on monetary economics) rather than on growth.  
In the last decade a growing number of macroeconomists have presented their field as a 
steadily  progressing  enterprise  because  they  now  work  in  a  common  theoretical  framework. 
                                                            
1 This paper was presented at the First International Symposium on the History of Economics (“The Integration of 
Micro and Macroeconomics from a Historical Perspective”), University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil, August 3-5, 
2009, and at the American Economic Association Meeting in Atlanta, January 2010. I am very grateful for helpful 
comments I received at both events, especially  those  from Kevin  Hoover, Michel De Vroey, Perry Mehrling and 
Gilberto Tadeu Lima, and also for those made by Tiago Mata. In addition, I thank Edward Prescott, Michael Lovell, 
Martin Eichenbaum, Lawrence Christiano, Robert King, and Michael Woodford for kindly answering a few questions. 
None of them is in any way responsible for the final outcome. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from Fapesp 
(Brazil) and CNPq (Brazil). This paper will be published by Edward Elgar in 2012 in a volume that Gilberto Tadeu 
Lima and I are editing, titled “Microfoundations Reconsidered: The Relationship of Micro and Macroeconomics in 
Historical Perspective.” 











Not Going Away? Microfoundations in the Making of 
a New Consensus in Macroeconomics
1 
 
Pedro Garcia Duarte2 
 P. G. Duarte  1 
Clearly, these economists have an understanding of the current consensus that is inseparable from 
their view that in the past macroeconomics could not progress much because competing schools 
fought  never-ending  theoretical  battles.  My  goal  in  this  essay  is  to  discuss  how  modern 
macroeconomists see this consensus that emerged in their field. Because they view this consensus 
as the last step of a historical ladder, its characterization is intimately related to how they see the 
history of their sub-discipline.3 In particular, I  will stress how a particular understa nding of the 
microfoundations that macroeconomics needs formed a common ground on which economists 
could agree and reach a consensus. 
In contrast to economists working in other areas of economics, macroeconomists perceive 
their field  as  not only composed of competing schools of thought but also characterized by a 
somewhat  recurrent  state  of  disarray.4  For  instance,  in  the  1970s  Robert  Hall,  “as  a  gross 
oversimplification,” divided macroeconomic thought in the U.S. at that time into two opposing 
schools: the freshwater school, which referred to the new classical economists (and later the real 
business cycle economists) located in universities near lakes or rivers such as the University of 
Chicago,  Carnegie-Mellon,  Rochester  and  Minnesota;  and  the  saltwater  school  comprising  the 
Keynesians at universities like Harvard, Berkeley, MIT, Princeton, Stanford and UCLA near either 
coast. Hall (1976, 1) explains:  
The fresh water view holds that fluctuations are largely attributable to supply shifts 
and  the  government  is  essentially  incapable  of  affecting  the  level  of  economic 
activity. The salt water view holds shifts in demand responsible for fluctuations and 
thinks government policies (at least monetary policy) is [sic] capable of affecting 
demand. Needless to say, individual contributors vary across a spectrum of salinity. 
 
Although Hall’s (1976) dichotomy, as Robert Gordon (1989, 177) put it, “has dominated the 
coffee-break oral tradition of American macroeconomic conferences” for decades, he was not alone 
in using the idea of a school of thought. Axel Leijonhufvud (1976), among others, explored more 
systematically how economics and its schools of thought could be interpreted according to the ideas 
of Thomas Kuhn ([1962] 1970)—which became very popular in economics in the late 1960s and 
1970s (Weintraub 2002, 263)5—and of Imre Lakatos (1970). Given Kuhn’s and Lakatos’s notoriety 
                                                            
3 It is important to emphasize that I discuss mainstream economists’ perceptions of the evolution of their field without 
taking issues with some of their claims. I want to explore the diversity that still exists in their understanding about both 
the consensus and the history of macroeconomics despite the alleged convergence that currently characterizes the field.  
4 Here I borrow William Nordhaus’s (1983, 247) term used later by Karl Brunner (1989) and N. Gregory Mankiw 
(1992a) in the very title of their papers (the latter paper draws heavily on Mankiw 1990). This expression was used 
earlier during the stagflation of the 1970s: see for instance Saul Hymans and Harold Shapiro (1975), a paper presented 
at the 1975 American Economic Association Meeting but published in 1978 in the Review of Economics and Statistics 
as a different version that did not use the term disarray. 
5 Blaug (1975) argued that by the mid-1970s economists had abandoned Popper and embraced Kuhn. However, some 
doubts on the applicability of Kuhn’s ideas to economics (and to the Keynesian revolution) were already raised, which 
led Blaug to propose that Lakatos’s framework may work better in economics. See Redman (1991, chap. 7) for further 
references on economists who were the first to apply Kuhn’s concepts to understand the evolution of their field. De 
Vroey in this volume discusses the transition from IS-LM to the new classical/real business cycle (RBC) P. G. Duarte  2 
among economists from the 1970s onward, and given that the view economists have about how 
science is conducted shape the history they and historians of economics write, it is not surprising to 
see  macroeconomists  increasingly  using  terms  such  as  schools  of  thought,  normal  science, 
revolutions, research programs and paradigms, and also talking about accumulation of knowledge 
and progress in their field.6 
Given that a school of economic thought is a loose concept that can be associated either with 
a Kuhnian paradigm or  a Lakatosian research program,  the fact that the concept of a school of 
thought survived well in economics from the 1970s to the present is not accidental.7 For example, 
Edmund Phelps (1990) identified seven schools of macroeconomic thought: the macroeconomics of 
Keynes; monetarism; the new classical school; the new Keynesians; supply-side macroeconomists; 
neoclassical and neo-neoclassical real business cycle theory (RBC) ; and, the structuralist school. 
Brian Snowdon, Robert Vane, and Peter Wynarczyk (1994) identified the same number of schools 
(or paradigms),8 and  some  might add the post-Keynesian school to this list.9 What becomes clear 
is that macroeconomists have a loose understanding of what makes a school and at the limit classify 
anyone with a particular idea as a school of thought. As an emblematic example of such a loose use 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
macroeconomics in Kuhnian terms. In contrast to this view of revolutions in macroeconomics, Lucas (2004, 21-22) 
recently has argued that economics is a field technically progressing in a common paradigm that was initiated and 
structured by Smith and Ricardo. He then denied the existence of either paradigm changes or scientific revolutions. A 
few years earlier, in an interview with Snowdon and Vane, Lucas (1998, 127) observed that economists have used the 
concept of scientific revolutions loosely and disagreed that the new classical approach resulted in a revolution in 
macroeconomics: “Sargent once wrote that you can interpret any scientific development as continuous evolution or 
discontinuous revolution, at your pleasure. For myself, I do not have any romantic association with the term 
‘revolution’. To me, it connotes lying, theft and murder, so I would prefer not to be known as a revolutionary.” 
6 See Weintraub (2002, chap. 9) for a witty discussion on how the kind of historical analysis produced by economists 
and historians of economics is tied to their methodological conceptions. In fact, the notion of a scientific revolution in 
economics predates Kuhn and was put forward by Keynes’s followers in the late 1940s (Pearce and Hoover 1995, 
183)—see also Laidler (1999), who argued that although Keynes himself understood that his work would revolutionize 
economics, “an element of myth-making is involved whenever the phrase ‘Keynesian revolution’ is deployed” because 
“the re-arrangement of ideas to which it refers was neither revolutionary in the usual sense of the word nor by any 
means uniquely Keynesian in origin” (3). Besides this, as Roger Backhouse (2010, chap. 9) correctly pointed out, 
Kuhn’s ideas were appealing to dissenting economists: through a scientific revolution, a new paradigm emerges, with 
the old and new paradigms being incommensurable. In the 1970s talk of a crisis in economics was widespread, which 
led heterodox economists to seek “consciously to create a new paradigm” (159). Although this certainly is important for 
understanding the popularity of Kuhnian ideas among economists, I want to explore here how mainstream economists, 
those defending the status quo, loosely used Kuhn ([1962] 1970) and even attributed to him a notion to which he was 
opposed, that science develops in a cumulative manner. 
7 Snowdon and Vane (1996) wrote a history of macroeconomics since the 1970s, when it was in a state of “disarray,” 
characterizing it as a succession of revolutions and counter-revolutions among “conflicting and competing approaches” 
(382). They then talked about “the new classical research programme” that “replaced monetarism as the main rival to 
Keynesianism.” A few lines further they talked about “the new classical and new Keynesian schools” (382, emphasis 
added). This is just one example of economists using a school of thought as a synonym for Lakatos’s concept of a 
research program. 
8 Kevin Hoover (1988, chap. 1) placed the new classical economists “among the principal schools of macroeconomic 
thought” (6). Howard Vane and John Thompson (1992) kept it simple: just three “mainstream schools of thought” 
(Keynesian economics, monetarism, and new classical economics). There are too many articles by macroeconomists in 
which several schools of thought are appraised. Among the most recent that follow this tradition, and that I will discuss 
later, are Goodfriend and King (1997), Taylor (1997), Woodford (2000), Mankiw (2006), and Akerlof (2007). See also 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988, 207) and Romer (1993, 5-6) for a brief overview of recent macroeconomics along these 
lines.  
9 Would either the Marxist or the institutionalist theories be included as schools of macroeconomic thought? Sheila 
Dow (1996, chap. 4) did include them (and others). P. G. Duarte  3 
of the term school in macroeconomics, Snowdon asked Leijonhufvud in an interview: “Do you 
attach  any  school  of  thought  label  to  yourself?  Do  you  see  yourself  as  some  kind  of 
Leijonhufvudian Keynesian?” To which Leijonhufvud (2004, 127) answered: “In one sense the 
groupings  have  disappeared  because  not  many  economists  are  interested  anymore.  One  of  my 
weaknesses is that I am psychologically averse to running with some herd, or even breeding a herd 
of my own.”  
As for the understanding that the history of macroeconomics, in contrast to that of other 
areas  of  economics,  is  not  characterized  by  steady  progress  within  an  unchanged  explanatory 
framework, here I quote at length Michael Woodford’s (2000, 2) account of the evolution of the 
fields  of  macro  and  microeconomics,  an  understanding  shared  by  N.  Gregory  Mankiw  (see 
Snowdon and Vane 1995, 50-51):10 
A discussion of the century’s progress in general economic theory—with primary 
emphasis  upon  what  is  taught  in  courses  on  “microeconomic  theory”,  which 
emphasize the decisions of individual households and firms—would surely be more 
suitable if my aim were to boost the prestige of my own field among the many 
distinguished representatives of other disciplines present here. But the story would 
be one with little suspense. For it would not be too much of an oversimplification to 
present the field as having progressed smoothly and steadily, developing theories of 
ever greater power and broader scope within an essentially unchanged explanatory 
framework, based on the concepts of optimizing individual behavior and market 
equilibrium, that were already central to economic thought in the previous century. 
Macroeconomics  instead  has  been  famously  controversial….Discussions  of 
twentieth-century  developments  in  macroeconomics  make  frequent  references  to 
“revolutions” and “counter-revolutions”, and the question of whether there has been 
progress at all (or which broad developments should count as progress) is a more 
lively topic of debate among economists than one might believe would be possible 
in the case of a topic with such a canonical status in the curriculum.11 
 
We  then  come  to  another  central  element  of  the  mainstream  macroeconomists’ 
comprehension about the nature and evolution of their field: macroeconomics has not only several 
competing schools and from time to time is in a state of disarray, but it also has moments of 
                                                            
10 Michael Woodford received his AB from the University of Chicago in 1977, after which he obtained a JD in 1980 
from Yale Law School. He then went to MIT for his PhD in economics, finishing in 1983, with Robert Solow as his 
official advisor. However, given the technical nature of his work (intertemporal economics), Woodford had Timothy J. 
Kehoe as his de facto advisor.  (Kehoe received his PhD in economics in 1979 from Yale under Herbert Scarf, and he 
was at MIT from 1980 to 1984 where he taught a graduate course on his field of expertise at the time, general 
equilibrium theory.) The third member of Woodford’s committee was Peter Diamond. As he recently explained to me 
in an email message (01/31/2011): “My later work on the ‘new neoclassical synthesis’ had a great deal to do with 
problems that I encountered in my studies under both Bob Solow and Peter Diamond, as I mention in the preface to my 
[2003] book. At the same time, what I understand about how to do general equilibrium modeling owes a tremendous 
amount to Tim Kehoe, who taught general equilibrium theory (not macroeconomics) when I was at MIT.” Mankiw also 
obtained his PhD from MIT in 1984 under Stanley Fischer. Fischer, another PhD from MIT, graduated in 1969 under 
Franklin Fischer. 
11 Historians of economics have produced narratives that show the complexity of the history of microeconomics, 
denying that this area progressed smoothly and steadily within an unchanged explanatory framework. For a few 
examples, see Weintraub (1992), Mirowski and Hands (1998), and Mirowski and Hands (2006). P. G. Duarte  4 
consensus when knowledge seems to progress at a faster rate.12 These macroeconomists identify 
two consensuses in the history of their sub-discipline: the neoclassical synthesis of the 1950s and 
1960s and the recent new consensus (from the late 1990s to the present), 13 labeled as the new 
neoclassical synthesis by Marvin Goodfriend and Robert King (1997). 14 Macroeconomists tend to 
characterize and tout such periods of synthesis as moments when the intellectual disarray and the 
untamed competition among schools—both with respect to macroeconomic theories and policies to 
be prescribed—are replaced by balanced conversation, points of convergence, better policymaking 
and scientific progress.15  
Macroeconomists emphasize progress and secure knowledge at times of consensus as a way 
of stressing that the science of the consensus is g ood and strong.16 The flip side of this argument 
used by macroeconomists in academia is to say that having schools competing in a state of disarray 
is a synonym for weak science: Stiglitz (1992, 40) pondered whether the fact that macroeconomists’ 
views were so divergent indicates that they are “simply ideologues looking for justifications for 
                                                            
12 For instance, Mankiw (1992b, 564-565) denied that macroeconomics is like a pendulum that “is destined to oscillate 
between two irreconcilable extremes,” the classical and the Keynesian views, and argued that it does make progress. 
Bill Gerrard (1996, 54) reviewed the book by Snowdon, Vane and Wynarczyk (1994) and argued that “macroeconomics 
can be seen as an evolving classical-Keynesian debate from which a developing consensus is ever-emerging as current 
disagreements are resolved, but new disagreements continually appear requiring the consensus to re-emerge.” He then 
added: “Within mainstream macroeconomics a clear case can be made that the competing schools of thought have 
generated cumulative progress” (65), and concluded that “macroeconomics is, and will remain, controversial as 
classical and Keynesian schools provide contending views on the self-adjusting nature of the macro economy and the 
necessity or otherwise of stabilization policy. This classical-Keynesian debate has been progressive and an ever-
emerging, albeit partial, consensus has resulted.…All schools of thought need to recognize more fully the inherent 
limitations of their own perspectives. Progress in macroeconomics requires competition and co-operation” (66). 
13 Different from this view that the neoclassical synthesis of the 1950s represented economic knowledge in progress, 
Wade Hands, in this volume, challenges the perception of a synthesis between micro and macroeconomics (as does De 
Vroey 2004). In his narrative, he proposes that co-evolution, rather than a synthesis, captures much better the 
relationship between micro and macroeconomics over that period: “ although Walrasian economics had a certain core 
conceptions [sic] that were identifiable over time, it also evolved and changed in response to, and because of, its contact 
with Keynesian economics,” while in the end microeconomics and macroeconomics remained identifiable and distinct 
fields (pp. 6-7, fn. 6). Additionally, Philip Mirowski in his chapter challenges the view that the synthesis was 
“Keynesian” because there was, according to him, an anti-Keynesian hostility by the major neoclassical schools in the 
US in the postwar period. In my narrative, notice that I usually refer to the neoclassical (instead of Keynesian) synthesis 
and I present it according to views held by practicing economists.  
14 Goodfriend and King both obtained their PhDs in economics from Brown University in 1980. King joined the 
University of Rochester faculty in 1978 without completing his PhD. He finished his thesis by spring of 1979 but 
missed the graduation deadlines and, thus, was awarded his degree in 1980. 
15 Lucas (1998, 133) denied the view that there is more consensus among microeconomists compared to 
macroeconomists, as defended by Woodford (2000). But Lucas agreed that a consensus in macroeconomics was 
emerging: “What is the microeconomic consensus you are referring to? Does it just mean that microeconomists agree 
on the Slutsky equation, or other purely mathematical propositions? Macroeconomists all take derivatives in the same 
way, too. On the matters of application and policy, microeconomists disagree as vehemently as macroeconomists—
neither side in an antitrust action has any difficulty in finding expert witnesses. I think there is a tremendous amount of 
consensus on macroeconomic issues today. But there is much that we don’t know, and so—necessarily—a lot to argue 
about.” Lucas also made the point that consensus refers to specific issues, not to a whole area, which needs certain 
disagreement among its members to progress: “Consensus can be reached on specific issues, but consensus for a 
research area as a whole is equivalent to stagnation, irrelevance and death” (133). 
16 This is particularly clear in the defense that V. V. Chari made of present-day macroeconomics in a testimony before 
the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of 
Representatives (Chari 2010): “I will argue that macroeconomics has made huge progress, especially in the last 25 years 
or so” (1). This hearing intended to “examine the promise and limits of modern macroeconomic theory in light of the 
current economic crisis” (Committee on Science and Technology 2010, 1). P. G. Duarte  5 
[their] political biases, or (no less worse) technicians, taking the assumptions provided to [them] by 
[their] ideologue brethren and exploring their consequences.” Returning to Kuhn ([1962] 1970), 
when  there  is  no  dominant  paradigm,  there  is  no  normal  science:  macroeconomists  have  an 
epistemological fear that the scientific foundations of their studies are weak or absent if they are 
always in a state of intellectual disorder.17 Alan Blinder’s (1989, vii) words could not be more 
emphatic about this perception among macroeconomists:  
macroeconomic  debates  during  my  professional  career  have  been  distressingly 
unrelenting,  acrimonious,  and  even  ideological.  The  constant  state  of  intense 
disputation takes a personal toll and, more importantly, inhibits scientific progress. 
Too much of our time, it seems to me, is spent defending obvious positions against 
preposterous challenges, too little doing what T. S. Kuhn called normal science. 
Sometimes I wonder if we are doing science at all.18 
 
As  an  antidote  to  such  a  perception,  the  scientific  and  academic  prestige  of 
macroeconomists among both economists in general and other scientists could be boosted if they 
had a story to tell of steady progress and secure knowledge (see Woodford’s quotation above and 
Mankiw’s welcoming words about the emerging consensus in Snowdon and Vane 1995, 60). In this 
respect, one needs to have macroeconomists working within a unified framework.  
On the other hand, policymakers keep asking macroeconomists what theory they should use 
to  guide  policy,  and  intellectual  disarray  here  is  not  good  either.  Macroeconomists  can  give  a 
convincing answer as long as they are able to show that there is a core of usable macroeconomics in 
which they all believe (to use the theme of a session at the 1997 AEA Meeting).19 In this sense, it is 
symptomatic that Frederic Mishkin (2007), who was  a Member of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System from 2006 to 2008, argued that the major advances in monetary economics 
                                                            
17 As Robert Solow (1983, 279) wrote: “Why…is macroeconomics in disarray? ‘Disarray’ is an understatement. 
Thoughtful people in other university departments look on with wonder. Professional disagreements exist in their field 
too—at the frontier there is always disagreement—but as outsiders they are shocked at the way alternative schools of 
thought in macroeconomics describe each other as wrong from the ground up. They wonder what kind of subject 
economics is. (Some of them are not above a little Schadenfreude either.)” Solow (2000, 151) started his article with 
similar lines: “These days macroeconomics has become more respectable than it used to be. I can remember when many 
economists liked to say: Microeconomics is not problematic, but I just can’t understand macroeconomics.” (On page 
155 he explicitly identified the current consensus with Kuhn’s concept of normal science.) Snowdon and Vane (1995) 
chose as the epigraph of the article they wrote based on an interview with Gregory Mankiw, Knut Wicksell’s (1851-
1926) words from a 1904 lecture to an audience interested in science: “in other fields of science these conflicts come to 
an end…It is only in the field of economics that the state of war seems to persist and remain permanent.” 
18 Blinder (1989, viii) argued that the state of macroeconomics in the late 1980s was very different from the early 
1970s, after he obtained his PhD from MIT (in 1971 under Robert Solow) and became an assistant professor at 
Princeton: “The academic world I entered in 1971 was quite different from the one I have inhabited ever since.…The 
monetarist controversy was simmering, but the Keynesian paradigm reigned supreme.” Later, he also referred to the 
new classical economics as a revolution (“Lucasian revolution”) that was largely destructive compared to “the period of 
normal science that had preceded it” (interview with Snowdon 2001, 112). 
19 The participants in this session included Robert Solow, John Taylor, Martin Eichenbaum, Alan Blinder, and Olivier 
Blanchard, whose essays were published in the Papers and Proceedings issue of the American Economic Review of 
1997 (vol. 87, no. 2). P. G. Duarte  6 
have allowed monetary policy to become more of a science.20 Mishkin’s opinion was a hope with 
which Goodfriend and King (1997) closed their article, and it was also shared to some degree by V. 
V. Chari and Patrick Kehoe (2006), by Goodfriend (2007), and by Jordi Galí and Mark Gertler 
(2007).21 
With  the new wave of consensus in macroeconomics (the new neoclassical synthesis), 
mainstream macroeconomists are emphasizing greatly the progress reached nowadays. For them, in 
essence, there is no Kuhnian substitution of one paradigm  for another via revolutions, but rather a 
merging of previously competing paradigms and a “steady accumulation of knowledge” (Blanchard 
2000,  1375).  How  is  that  possible?  “Largely  because  facts  have  a  way  of  not  going  away” 
(Blanchard  2009,  210,  paraphrasing  his  earlier  statement  “the  force  of  facts  is  hard  to  avoid” 
(Blanchard 1997a, 245)). Said in another way, “to some extent, this is because positions that were 
vigorously  defended  in  the  past  have  had  to  be  conceded  in  the  face  of  further  argument  and 
experience” (Woodford 2009, 268). Therefore, facts and arguments made economists from different 
camps develop “a largely shared vision both of fluctuations and of methodology” (Blanchard 2009, 
210).22  
In a nutshell, both in theory and practice,  claiming a consensus means that mainstream 
macroeconomists now agree on the right way of doing macroeconomics—and it is right because it 
has become generally accepted, after facts and arguments refuted wrong theories and conventions 
had become uniform.23 Knowing how to do something is the prerequisite for doing it right and thus 
for increasing the stock of knowledge. 
In order to proceed with the analysis of the new consensus, I will first point out briefly that 
macroeconomists understand that disagreements still exist. Following this point I will explore how 
these economists picture the period of wide disagreement  that occurred after the breakdown of the 
first neoclassical synthesis (roughly from the 1970s to the early 1990s). Having this picture clear in 
one’s mind is important because the progress associated with the new consensus is best identified 
by comparing the current state of macroeconomics with the preceding disarray. I then discuss how 
                                                            
20 Mishkin is another of the economists being discussed in this paper who obtained his PhD in economics from MIT (in 
1976 under Stanley Fischer). His first position after graduating was as an economist in the summer of 1977 with the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. After this he held several academic and policy-oriented positions. 
21 Continuing to pay attention to the academic training of the economists under study, Galí also received his PhD in 
economics from MIT, in 1989 under Olivier Blanchard who also has a PhD in economics from MIT (1977, under 
Stanley Fischer). Chari, Kehoe, and Gertler are all non-MIT graduates: they received their PhDs in economics from 
Carnegie-Mellon (1980), Harvard (1986), and Stanford (1978), respectively. 
22 See also Blanchard (2008). Mankiw (2006, 38) stated that accompanying the emergence of the new consensus was 
the retirement of an older generation of vitriolic macroeconomists and its replacement by “a younger generation of 
macroeconomists who have adopted a culture of greater civility.” You may question Mankiw’s view and have trouble 
identifying this new generation of civilized men after reading the response that Chari and Kehoe gave to Solow’s 
comments on their 2006 article, for example (Chari and Kehoe 2008). 
23 Blanchard (2009, 212) once again exemplified this understanding among present-day macroeconomists: “Facts have 
a way of eventually forcing irrelevant theory out (one wishes it happened faster). And good theory also has a way of 
eventually forcing bad theory out.” P. G. Duarte  7 
mainstream  macroeconomists  saw  the  emergence  of  the  new  synthesis:  the  development  of  a 
theoretical common ground on which different schools could negotiate models and what counts as 
relevant empirical evidence, and thus resolve disagreements to reach a consensus.24 Identifying 
macroeconomics with this area implies that those macroeconomists who are not willing to  work in 
this arena are outsiders and do not count in the consensus. I will stress how such an area was built 




2.  A New Consensus in Macroeconomics  
For many followers of the new neoclassical synthesis, the existence of a consensus in their 
field did not mean that room for disagreement no longer existed (Goodfriend 2007, 3; Blanchard 
2009, 210; Woodford 2009, section III; Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2009). After all, as Solow 
(1983, 279) pointed out, there is always (some degree of) disagreement at the frontier. Nonetheless, 
they all agree that modern macroeconomics, in theory and in practice, has changed substantially 
when compared with the 1970s, and for the better: 
Over  the  last  three  decades,  macroeconomic  theory  and  the  practice  of 
macroeconomics  by  economists  have  changed  significantly—for  the  better. 
Macroeconomics  is  now  firmly  grounded  in  the  principles  of  economic  theory. 
These advances have not been restricted to the ivory tower. Over the last several 
decades, the United States and other countries have undertaken a variety of policy 
changes that are precisely what macroeconomic theory of the last 30 years suggests. 
Chari and Kehoe (2006, 3).25 
 
In the 1970s and the 1980s, the perspective of mainstream economists was well summarized 
by Blanchard when he said that macroeconomics “looked like a battlefield” with “researchers split 
in  different  directions,  mostly  ignoring  each  other,  or  else  engaging  in  bitter  fights  and 
controversies” (Blanchard 2009, 210): the neoclassical synthesis had broken down and over time 
monetarists, new classical and real business cycle (freshwater) economists, and new Keynesians 
(saltwater)  economists  fought  one  another  and  disagreed  on  many  issues.  Mainstream 
macroeconomists saw the new synthesis as a bridge between two broad fields, the classical (that 
incorporates  monetarist  ideas  and  is  composed  of  the  new  classical  and  real  business  cycle 
theorists)  and  the  Keynesian  (basically  the  new  Keynesians  and  the  Keynesians  of  the  1970s 
                                                            
24 Zouache (2004, 98) called this a “common methodological reference to the microeconomic foundations of 
macroeconomics.” As will become clear, while I agree with this point, I disagree with the author’s view that the new 
neoclassical synthesis is “more an extension of the Real Business Cycle research programme than a synthesis between 
two research traditions [RBC and new Keynesian]” (108).  
25 Goodfriend (2004, 21) and Galí and Gertler (2007, 25) share with Chari and Kehoe their enthusiasm about the state 
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associated with the large-scale econometric models).26 As Woodford (2009, 268) argued, while in 
the  1970s  and  1980s  there  were  “fundamental  disagreements  among  leading  macroeconomists 
about what kind of questions one might reasonably seek to answer or what kinds of theoretical 
analyses or empirical studies should even be admitted as contributions to knowledge,” nowadays 
these deep disagreements and questionings no longer exist. 
Before discussing how macroeconomists characterized the new synthesis, I would like to 
stress briefly the differences between the new classical and RBC research programs on the one 
hand, and the new Keynesian program on the other hand.  
 
3.  Battling Macroeconomics  
The Keynesian orthodoxy of the 1950s and 1960s, with the then ubiquitous IS-LM model, 
was  shattered in  the 1970s—to  use Hoover’s (1988, 3) words.27  On the theoretical  side, weak 
microfoundations increasingly made professional economists unhappy with this Keynesianism. On 
the  practical  side,  the  stagflation  of  the  1970s  made  economists  question  the  ability  of  the 
Keynesian device to incorporate inflation into their IS-LM framework: the Phillips curve (Hoover 
1988, chap. 1).28 Milton Friedman (1968) and Edmund Phelps (1967) criticized the Phillips curve 
for ignoring the long-run neutrality of money and for not incorporating expectations (De Vroey and 
Hoover 2004, 7).29 New classical macroeconomists like Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent wanted 
to bury Keynesian theorizing (as in their famous 197 9 article) and to propose a market -clearing 
approach to economic fluctuations—or “to see whether the ‘expectations view’ can be pushed far 
enough to yield something like a full business cycle theory.”30 
Lucas (1976) criticized the use of reduced-form econometric models for policy evaluation 
(i.e., simulating and comparing paths of endogenous variables under alternative economic policies): 
the parameters of estimated aggregate relationships are themselves a function of deeper preference 
and technology parameters and such a function changes when the government adopts a new policy. 
                                                            
26 See for example Mankiw (1989, 79), Goodfriend and King (1997, 232) and Woodford (2000, 29). 
27 Blanchard (2009, 210) referred to the crisis in macroeconomics in the 1970s in more histrionic terms, as the 
“explosion (in both the positive and negative meaning of the word) of the field in the 1970s.” 
28 On the importance of the high inflation of the 1970s to the defeat of Keynesianism and the development of the new 
classical economics, Lucas (1998, 122) argued that: “The main ideas that are associated with rational expectations were 
developed by the early 1970s so the importance of the inflation that occurred was that it confirmed some of these 
theoretical ideas. In a way the timing couldn’t have been better.” 
29 The point here is not to draw a complete scenario of the evolution of macroeconomics in the postwar period, which 
should include many issues. I just want to give a rough sense of how practitioners see the major changes in their field. 
Among the issues that are part of that broader scenario is the general disequilibrium theory of the 1960s and 1970s, 
which, in contrast to Mankiw (2006, 35), I do not consider to be the first wave of the new Keynesian work—for me this 
wave was initiated in the 1980s with the work on static (usually partial equilibrium) models done by Mankiw, Romer, 
Akerlof and others. 
30 This was how Lucas described his intentions in his paper (published later, in 1973) to Otto Eckstein (Harvard 
University) in a letter dated January 20, 1970, in which he accepted an invitation to present a seminar at Harvard 
(Folder “1970 Correspondence R. E. Lucas,” Box 32; Robert E. Lucas, Jr. Papers, Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special 
Collections Library, Duke University). P. G. Duarte  9 
New classical, RBC and new Keynesian economists all worked in a similar fashion to address the 
Lucas critique by providing the kind of microfoundations that nowadays characterizes not only their 
research programs but also the models of the new consensus macroeconomics.31 It is important to 
add that these economists used the conceptual tool of a representative agent as part of their answer 
to  the Lucas  critique  without  providing  clear  justification  (as  pointed  out  by  Hoover in  his 
contribution to this volume). 
During the 1970s, the 1980s and early 1990s new classical, real business cycle, and new 
Keynesian economists were in a battle. They had important points of disagreement, but they also 
shared some methodological and theoretical  elements. To some degree, mos tly with respect to 
policy implications of their models, the new classical and real business cycle macroeconomists, on 
the one hand, and the new Keynesians on the other hand, seemed to criticize each other from the 
ground up—to repeat Solow’s (1983) words. Or, to use Paul Krugman’s (2000, 39) words, there 
was a great schism in macroeconomics in the 1980s, with on the one hand the RBC economists 
arguing that “because [they] have not managed to find a micro-foundation for non-neutrality of 
money, money must be neutral after all,” and, on the other hand, the new Keynesians arguing that 
“[they] need some other explanation of apparent non-neutrality, resting in something like menu 
costs or bounded rationality.” 
Even macroeconomists not connected to either of those two approaches understood that 
these groups differed by virtue of faiths in alternative sets of tenets. For instance, David Cass, a 
student  of  Hirofumi  Uzawa  and  an  economist  who  made  seminal  contributions  to  the  optimal 
growth literature, the model that is the benchmark of the RBC literature, stated in an interview in 
1998:32  
But the thing about real business -cycle theory I suppose is that it is almost like a 
religion. I have talked quite a bit with Victor [Rios -Rull], whom I have a lot of 
respect for, who has this view, this view that he is convinced quite strongly about, 
that this is the only way to look at the world, to l ook at economics.
[33]  When 
anybody tells me it’s the only thing, I’m skeptical. I don’t believe that using general 
equilibrium theory is the only way of looking at the world….But I also think that the 
general equilibrium model itself has a role, that it is still an important benchmark, 
and that there are still a lot of interesting things that can be done with that theory.  
 
What then are the core elements of each of the two groups, new classical/RBC and new 
Keynesian macroeconomics? The new classical and RBC followers both worked in a framework 
with three basic tenets that Hoover (1988, 13-14) used to describe the new classicism. First, agents 
                                                            
31 The call for microfoundations is not simply a result of the Lucas critique. Hoover in this volume provides a detailed 
analysis of the different microfoundational programs that marked the history of macroeconomics since the 1930s and 
argues that they even have a pre-history. His discussion historicizes the notion of microfoundations. De Vroey, also 
writing in this volume, explores in detail the microfoundations requirement as expressed by Lucas and the justification 
he presented for his enterprise. 
32 Spear and Wright (1998, 547). 
33 José-Víctor Ríos-Rull obtained his PhD in 1990 from the University of Minnesota, under Edward Prescott. P. G. Duarte  10 
(in fact, a representative agent) choose real variables based solely on real, instead of nominal or 
monetary, factors. Second, agents are continuously in equilibrium because, “to the limits of their 
information,”  they  are  “consistent  and  successful  optimizers”  (14).  Third,  agents  have  rational 
expectations, i.e., they “make no systematic errors in evaluating the economic environment” (14). I 
add  to  this  set  the  assumptions  about  the  economic  environment  that  these  models  commonly 
assume: an economy working in perfect competition with prices that are flexible to adjust and clear 
all markets.  Moreover,  the new  classical/RBC  equilibrium  intertemporal  model of the business 
cycle that emerged from these hypotheses identified either real shocks (including both aggregate 
demand  and  aggregate  supply  shocks,  like  fiscal  policy  and  technology  shocks)  or  errors  in 
expectations as the sources of fluctuations.  
Over  time,  several  of  the  models  in  this  new  classical/RBC  tradition  generated  five 
neutrality results, as Akerlof (2007, 6) concisely discussed: (a) the independence of consumption 
and  current  income  through  the  life-cycle  permanent  income  hypothesis  (i.e.,  a  denial  of  the 
consumption function used in the IS-LM model); (b) the irrelevance of current profits to investment 
spending  through  the  Modigliani-Miller  theorem;  (c)  the  natural  rate  theory  of  unemployment 
which states that in the long-run inflation and unemployment are independent (i.e., the long-run 
Phillips curve is vertical);34 (d) the inability of monetary policy to stabilize output as a consequence 
of the rational expectations hypothesis (economic policies cannot systematically affect real output, a 
result known as policy irrelevance; therefore, actual output is systematically equal to its potential 
level); and,  (e) the irrelevance  to consumption  of taxes and  debt as ways of financing  budget 
deficits (Ricardian equivalence). These neutrality results went against many results associated with 
either the Keynesian orthodoxy of the postwar period or, more importantly, the new Keynesian 
camp that I will discuss later. 
 
3.1  Differences  Among  Siblings:  The  New  Classical  and  the  Real  Business  Cycle 
Macroeconomics 
Although  it  is  sometimes  convenient  to  group  together  the  new  classical  and  the  real 
business cycle macroeconomists,35 a group to be contrasted to the new Keynesians in the present 
narrative, there are three important differences between these two camps. First, at their origins these 
groups had different methods of bringing their model s  to the data. New classical economist s 
                                                            
34 In several of the rational expectations models, the Phillips curve is also vertical in the short run. Hoover (1988, 28-
31) explained that these models have an “ephemeral Phillips curve.” 
35 In fact, RBC macroeconomists can be seen as continuing the research agenda established by new classical 
economists like Lucas. This was what Prescott wrote to Lucas in 1991: “much of what we are doing [at Minnesota] is 
working out the research program that you defined. I wish there were a noun for calibrate or a noun that captured the 
idea of being rigorous” (letter from Prescott to Lucas, Feb. 19, 1991, folder “1991 Correspondence,” Box 25; Robert E. 
Lucas, Jr. Papers, Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University). P. G. Duarte  11 
developed not only solution methods for their model but also estimated them.36 In contrast, RBC 
theorists became known mostly for their calibration method, as clearly defended by Kydland and 
Prescott  (1991a),  and  for  their  disapproval  of  econometrics. 37  They  generally  calibrate  the 
parameters of their models based on equations evaluated at steady -state so that the business cycle 
models replicate “stylized facts” of long-run growth theory: the steady-state variables are replaced 
by their sample means (or other moments) in the data, and the equations are solved for the unknown 
parameters. Kydland and Prescott (1982, 1346) referred to this procedure as estimating parameters 
“using steady-state considerations,” while Kydland (1992, 477) put it as determining “parameter 
values on the basis of non-business-cycle measurements.” To this end microeconomic empirical 
evidence  can  be  used  also  to  calibrate  some  parameters  of  the  model.  After  calibrating  the 
parameters, they test the model’s ability to reproduce short-run facts as co-movements, variances 
and means of aggregate variables in the data (real output, consumption, hours worked, and so on).38 
Kydland and Prescott (1991a) claimed to be the heirs of a tradition that dates back to Ragnar Frisch 
in the 1930s (a point criticized by Hartley, Hoover and Salyer 1997, 35) . While Frisch and other 
economists in the 1960s and 1970s calibrated their models by Frisch because it was the only option 
available, given that they lacked the time series needed to estimate the equations, the RBC theorists 
of the 1980s and the 1990s chose calibration as their empirical method because they believed that it 
was the best for measuring the parameters “that characterize preferences, technology, information 
structure, and institutional arrangements” assumed in their general equilibrium model (Kydland and 
Prescott 1991a, 168). Kydland and Prescott (1991a, 169) summarized their empirical method as 
follows: 
                                                            
36 See Lucas (1973) and several articles in the volume Lucas and Sargent edited in 1981. 
37 This does not mean that there were no estimated RBC models, but rather that calibration was the preferred method 
used by RBC theorists. Nonetheless, there is a saying that people ascribe to Prescott that embodies the RBC distaste for 
estimation and support of calibration: “don’t regress; progress.” Some of Prescott’s students tell the story that he had 
posted this phrase on his office door in Minnesota in the 1970s to tease his then colleague and econometrician 
Christopher Sims. Confronted with this story, Prescott (email message June 11, 2010) wrote: “My mentor Michael C. 
Lovell in an interesting paper attributed the quote to me. He told me that I had said it I think in the early 1970s. I like 
the statement. Measurement without theory has delivered little. As the result of interaction between theory and 
measurement, great progress has been made and is being made in our science.” In fact, this phrase was the epigraph 
attributed to Prescott in Lovell and Selover’s 1994 article, published in the software reviews section of the Economic 
Journal (I could not locate any other reference to this phrase in economic articles available online). Lovell (email 
message June 11, 2010) explained further: “I don’t remember the precise source of ‘Progress, Don’t Regress.’  I don’t 
think it was when we overlapped at Carnegie-Mellon in the 1960’s.…Perhaps I picked the quote off of his home page. I 
looked up his home page just now, and it is not there. I had not heard the office door and Chris Sims story, but it could 
be true.” He then pointed out to me a magazine article published in 2003 by the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank, in 
which it is written: “[some authors] employ a technique Prescott generally scorns: statistical regression. ‘Progress, don’t 
regress,’ he says with a smile, quoting the slogan featured prominently on his Internet home page” (Clement 2003). 
Even if this phrase was not on Prescott’s office door, it seems nonetheless to have teased Chris Sims (2004), who wrote 
a critical article on “econometrics for policy analysis” in which he discussed calibration and estimation and used the 
words progress and regress in the title. 
38 See, for example, Thomas Cooley and Edward Prescott’s chapter in Cooley (1995a) and Cooley (1995b). For a 
thorough discussion of the idealized nature of RBC models, how they fit the data and how they can be tested, see 
Hoover (1995), Hartley, Hoover, and Salyer (1997), and a symposium published in the Economic Journal in 1995 (vol. 
105, no. 433). For more on calibration, see also Boumans (2002) and Prescott and Candler (2008). P. G. Duarte  12 
The  key  econometric  problem  is  to  use  statistical  observations  to  select  the 
parameters for an experimental economy. Once these parameters have been selected, 
the central part of the econometrics of the general equilibrium approach to business 
cycles is the computational experiment. This is the vehicle by which theory is made 
quantitative…The main steps in econometric analyses are as follows: defining the 
question; setting up the model; calibrating the model; and reporting the findings. 
 
It is important to stress that the opposition between calibration and the use of statistical 
regressions in macroeconomic models really was not minor. Kydland (1992, 477) implicitly made 
the case that calibration is better than estimation because “the parameters should not be chosen so 
as to produce the best fit of the model to the business cycle data. The goal is to provide the clearest 
possible answer to the question [at hand]. In some cases, deviations of the theory from the data even 
provide independent verification of the answer.” As late as the early 2000s, after looking closely at 
models  used  in  several  central  banks,  Sims  (2004)  argued  that  the  probability  approach  to 
macroeconomic models had not yet disappeared but “is under siege” (170). He then mentioned the 
existing “dispute today between econometricians and ‘extreme calibrationists’” (171) explaining 
that: 
By the latter I mean economists who would claim that calibration, i.e. inference 
without  formal  appeal  to  probability-based  statistical  methods,  is  not  just  an 
occasionally, arguably, necessary expedient when probability-based inference is too 
complicated, but instead an improved replacement for probability-based inference. 
 
A second distinction between new classical and RBC theorists is the absence of money in 
most  RBC  models,  which  thus  focus  on  the  real  sources  of  fluctuations:  among  these  sources 
Kydland  and  Prescott  (1991b)  estimated  that  technological  shocks  (summarized  in  the  Solow 
residual) explain about seventy percent of US business cycle fluctuations in the period after the 
Korean War. For instance, Lucas (1998, 129) when asked about the differences between Friedman, 
Tobin  and  himself  on  the  one  hand,  who  thought  (according  to  Snowdon  and  Vane,  the 
interviewers) of the economy as fluctuating around a long-run smooth trend, and RBC economists 
like Prescott and Kydland on the other hand, answered that the difference was in their view of the 
sources of the trend: 
Well, they [Kydland and Prescott] talk about business cycles in terms of deviations 
from trend as well. The difference is that Friedman, Tobin and I would think of the 
sources of the trend as being entirely from the supply side and the fluctuations about 
the trend as being induced by monetary shocks. Of course, we would think of very 
different kinds of theoretical models to deal with the long-run and the short-run 
issues. Kydland and Prescott took the sources that we think of as long-term to see 
how well they would do for these short-term movements. The surprising thing was 
how well it worked. I am still mostly on the side of Friedman and Tobin, but there is 
no question that our thinking has changed a lot on the basis of this work. 
 
The gist behind the RBC position of explaining fluctuations on the basis of real factors lies 
in two “facts” reported by Kydland and Prescott (1990): first, that prices are countercyclical, rather P. G. Duarte  13 
than procyclical, suggesting that movements in prices are associated with shifts of the aggregate 
supply  function  along  a  given  aggregate  demand  function.  The  second  fact  is  that  monetary 
aggregates (such as monetary base or M1) do not lead the cycle, a view that was contrary to the 
prevailing understanding that they do lead it, associated with the works of Milton Friedman and 
Anna Schwartz (1963) and Chris Sims (1972, 1989). Both facts went against “the prevalence in the 
1970s of studies that use equilibrium models with monetary policy or price surprises as the main 
source  of  fluctuations,”  i.e.  new  classical  models  (Kydland  and  Prescott  1990,  7).  Although 
Kydland  and  Prescott  (1991a,  176)  affirmed  that  monetary  shocks  “are  a  leading  candidate  to 
account  for  a  significant  fraction  of  the  unaccounted-for  aggregate  fluctuations”  (that  is, 
fluctuations not explained by technology shocks), and that they foresaw the coming of an RBC 
model with money, the first RBC models did not have room for money and thus, could in no way 
analyze monetary policy and inflation stabilization.39 In contrast, new classical thinkers did have 
unsystematic monetary shocks in their  equilibrium models of the business cycle and talked about 
“purely monetary cycles” and monetary policy (Lucas 1975). 
The differences in the sources of economic fluctuations between new classical and RBC 
theoreticians can be seen with crystal clarity in two letters that Lucas and Prescott exchanged in 
1990.  In  the  early  1990s  Lucas  was  working  with  Michael  Woodford  on  a  paper  in  which 
unanticipated changes in nominal spending flows imply a less-than-proportional adjustment in price 
levels (i.e., these shocks have real effects).40 After reading a draft sent to him by Kydland and 
Prescott, Lucas sent his comments to Prescott (copying Kydland as well) and wrote: 
                                                            
39 Nonetheless, in the early 1990s these economists expanded their agenda to include things like money, heterogeneous 
agents, and imperfect competition, for instance (see Cooley 1995a). 
40 Lucas wrote the first draft alone in 1989 (see draft “The Effects of Monetary Shocks When Prices are Set in 
Advance,” November 1989, in folder “FIXP / BANK,” Box 1; Robert E. Lucas, Jr. Papers, Rare Book, Manuscript, and 
Special Collections Library, Duke University). In the introduction he wrote not only that this model, resembling Lucas 
(1972), was designed to be “consistent with the centuries old observation, documented most recently and 
comprehensively by Kormendi and Meguire (1984), that increased monetary instability is associated with increased real 
instability” (1), but also that “in its reliance on nominal prices that are set in advance, the model in this paper is similar 
to those of Fischer, Phelps and Taylor” (2). These three papers are part of the new Keynesian literature that advocated 
the non-neutrality of money in the short run. Woodford joined this project in the second semester of 1990, but their 
paper has not been published since then (there is a version available as NBER working paper 4250, January 1993, and a 
1994 revised version  downloadable from Woodford’s webpage). There is a curious letter from Lucas to Lars Svensson, 
on March 20, 1990. Svensson made comments on the paper by Lucas (“The Effects of Monetary Shocks When Prices 
are Set in Advance”) and sent reprints of his papers with sticky-price models, including one that he presented in the 
same session where Lucas had presented a paper at the “Econometric Society World Meeting in Cambridge around 
1985.” Lucas then replied (emphasis added): “My apologies for not relating this work to yours on sticky prices, which 
you had sent me long ago in working paper form. At that time [mid 1980s], I was so hostile to the idea of pre-set prices 
that I simply filed your paper unread and forgot about it!” However, in 1979 he had drafted a paper (titled “Price 
Fixing”) whose introduction shows a Lucas who believed that there was clear evidence that prices do not adjust 
instantaneously (Folder “Price Fixing,” Box 1). Here Lucas talks about “price fixing among sellers” being a common 
practice “dating at least back to [Adam] Smith” (p. 1). However, this did not mean that Lucas favored the way price 
stickiness was treated in the so-called disequilibrium macroeconomics. In a report to Henri Theil in 1978, Lucas was 
uneasy with Negishi’s book proposal in which, as in the works of Barro and Grossman and Malinvaud, he attempted “to 
obtain ‘Keynesian’ results from a general equilibrium model by arbitrarily fixing some prices.” Lucas concluded: “I am 
not very sympathetic to this line—I think it assumes away the difficult and most crucial issues—and have not followed P. G. Duarte  14 
I don’t agree with your remark that “persistence” is a difficulty with monetary-shock 
business cycle theories. Monetary shocks must work because people react to them as 
if  they  were  taste/technology  shocks,  because  they  can’t  tell  the  difference  or 
because  they  are  locked  in  to  certain  decisions.  If  so,  then  any  theory  of  the 
persistence of the consequences of actual taste/technology (like yours and Finn’s) 
should be adaptable without change to monetary shocks. If an investment project, 
say, is initiated in your model, this has consequences far into the future that should 
be independent of why the project was initiated. In Frisch’s language, I think the 
hard part of a monetary theory is getting a coherent picture of the impulses.41 
 
Prescott then replied (also copying Kydland) that he sticks to what he and Kydland have 
argued in the paper and that they originally had money in the model but decided to drop it because 
monetary shocks could not generate persistent real effects: 
I stick with my position that a problem for monetary shock theories of business 
cycle fluctuations is the lack of a propagation mechanism. So far, only relatively 
persistent changes in factors that affect steady state of the deterministic model have 
been  shown  to  induce  business  cycle  type  fluctuations.  Time-to-build,  staggered 
contracts, and/or capital accumulation do not provide a mechanism that propagates 
nonpersistent  shocks,  (whether  they  be  technology,  monetary,  preference  or 
something else), in such a way that business cycle type fluctuations are induced. 
Incidentally, we dropped the monetary example from the paper.42 
 
There is yet another letter from Lucas to Prescott earlier in the same year in which Lucas 
showed on the one hand his admiration for the RBC research agenda that he was then teaching to 
his graduate students, but on the other hand stressed that money for him was an important element 
missing in RBC macro models: 
My first  year macro course is now over half devoted to work by  you and  your 
students (here I count Kydland and Cooley, as well as your Minnesota protégés), 
and if you ever come around to taking money seriously again, I suppose that will go 
to 100 percent!43 
 
A third difference between new classical and RBC approaches is the existence of imperfect 
information in the earlier new classical models and its non-existence in the first RBC models. 
Lucas’s island model (following a metaphor proposed by Phelps 1970, 6-10), for example, makes 
the imperfect information work as a mechanism propagating the shocks and thus generating serially 
correlated  movements  in  real  output.  In  contrast,  RBC  macroeconomists  initially  developed 
equilibrium models under perfect competition and information. Consequently, these models “add 
relatively little to the pattern of fluctuations in real output beyond what is implicit in the technology 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
it very closely. Because of this I cannot judge its contribution to this literature very fairly.” (Letter from Lucas to Theil, 
Feb. 24, 1978, folder “Correspondence - 1978-1,” Box 30). 
41 Emphasis added. Letter from Lucas to Prescott, October 22, 1990, folder “1990 Correspondence,” Box 26; Robert E. 
Lucas, Jr. Papers, Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University.  
42 Emphasis added. Letter from Prescott to Lucas, November 1, 1990, folder “1990 Correspondence,” Box 26; Robert 
E. Lucas, Jr. Papers, Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University. 
43 Letter from Lucas to Prescott, May 18, 1990, folder “1990 Correspondence,” Box 26; Robert E. Lucas, Jr. Papers, 
Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University.  P. G. Duarte  15 
shocks themselves” as Hartley, Hoover and Salyer (1997, 46) discussed (and as Prescott explained 
in a previous quote).  
 
3.2  The New Keynesians: Fighting the Opponents and Talking to Them 
The new Keynesians wanted to study monetary economies in which nominal rigidities and 
market  failures  make  fluctuations  costly  and  therefore  open  the  door  for  stabilization  policies. 
Imperfect competition is the typical environment to get all these elements in place. Moreover, the 
new Keynesians initially identified monetary shocks as the major source of economic fluctuations, 
in contrast to the RBC theorists, and  they argued that economic (monetary) policy affects real 
output in the short run as opposed to both the new classical and RBC economists (in the new 
classical world only unanticipated shocks can affect real variables). Moreover, new Keynesians 
brought unemployment and the non-neutrality of money in the short run back to macroeconomics. 
In terms of empirical research,  they  favored estimation techniques (often equation-by-equation) 
instead of calibration.  
Mankiw (1989, 79) summarized very well in the first paragraphs of his article the major 
differences between the “classical school” (especially the RBC theory, which share some elements 
with the new classical macroeconomics) and the “Keynesian school” (the new Keynesians): 
The  debate  over  the  source  and  propagation  of  economic  fluctuations  rages  as 
fiercely today as it did  50  years  ago in  the  aftermath  of  Keynes’s  The General 
Theory and in the midst of the Great Depression. Today, as then, there are two 
schools  of  thought.  The  classical  school  emphasizes  the  optimization  of  private 
economic actors, the adjustment of relative prices to equate supply and demand, and 
the  efficiency  of  unfettered  markets.  The  Keynesian  school  believes  that 
understanding  economic  fluctuations  requires  not  just  studying  the  intricacies  of 
general  equilibrium,  but  also  appreciating  the  possibility  of  market  failure  on  a 
grand scale. 
Real business cycle theory is the latest incarnation of the classical view of 
economic fluctuations. It assumes that there are large random fluctuations in the rate 
of  technological  change.  In  response  to  these  fluctuations,  individuals  rationally 
alter their levels of labor supply and consumption. The business cycle is, according 
to this theory, the natural and efficient response of the economy to changes in the 
available production technology.44 
 
Mankiw  then  stated  that  he  does  not  believe  that  real  business  cycle  theory  offers  an 
“empirically plausible explanation of economic fluctuations” (79). Moreover, the “facts” that RBC 
macroeconomists used to criticize the new Keynesians did not serve as conclusive evidence to 
                                                            
44 Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993, 24) also stressed the differences between the two groups despite their agreement upon 
two methodological premises -- founding macroeconomics on microeconomic principles and the use of simple general 
equilibrium models. The authors argued that while RBC and new classical economists “base their theories on simple 
(we would say simplistic) models of markets that employ perfect information, perfect competition, the absence of 
transactions costs, and the presence of a complete set of markets.…In contrast, modern Keynesians have identified 
these real world ‘imperfections’ as the source of the problem: leaving them out of the model is like leaving Hamlet out 
of the play.” P. G. Duarte  16 
refute these models. For instance, Ball and Mankiw (1994) examined the major criticisms raised 
against the new Keynesian agenda and refuted them as being unconvincing: to take one example, 
the countercyclicality of the price level, for these authors,  is  an artifact  produced by the RBC 
practice of detrending data with the so-called Hodrick-Prescott filter.45 
Yet  another  im portant  illustration  of  the  schism  between  new  classical/RBC 
macroeconomists and the (new) Keynesians is given by Ball and Mankiw’s 1994 article from the 
saltwater camp and, from the freshwater flank, Lucas’s comments on it. Ball and Mankiw (1994, 
127) stated that there are two kinds of macroeconomists, those who are “part of a long tradition in 
macroeconomics,” which includes “John Maynard Keynes, Milton Friedman, Franco Modigliani, 
and James Tobin,” who believe “that price stickiness plays a central role in short-run economic 
fluctuations,” and those who do not, whom the authors labeled as “heretics.” For the authors “a 
macroeconomist faces no greater decision than whether to be a traditionalist or a heretic” (128).  
On the other hand, Lucas (1994, 154) reproached Ball and Mankiw’s characterization of the 
“heretics”  as  “‘silly’  people,  ‘almost  pathological’,”  on  the  grounds  that  “the  cost  of  [this] 
ideological approach…is that one loses contact with the progressive, cumulative science aspect of 
macroeconomics.”  He  deplored  Ball’s  and  Mankiw’s  following  “the  tradition  of  argument  by 
innuendo, of caricaturing one’s unnamed opponents, of using them as foils to dramatize one’s own 
position” and asked that they put all this behind them “and return to the research contributions we 
know  they  are  capable  of  making”  (155).  What  is  interesting  is  not  only  Lucas’s  call  to  pay 
attention  to  the  cumulative  knowledge  produced  in  macroeconomics  by  both  freshwater  and 
saltwater camps, but also his criticism of Ball and Mankiw for not perceiving that a “synthesis of 
old and new ideas” might occur and thus “might leave us better off” (155).  
Therefore,  despite  the  major  points  of  disagreement  among  the  new  classical  and  RBC 
macroeconomists, on the one hand, and the new Keynesians on the other hand, these two camps 
shared significant methodological and theoretical grounds: they all adopted the rational expectations 
hypothesis, favored general equilibrium models with microfoundations, and had in their benchmark 
models a representative agent in an environment of complete markets and complete information. It 
is true that, for instance, the new Keynesians George Akerlof and Janet Yellen (1985) introduced 
small deviations from rationality at the individual level that generated significant aggregate effects. 
Nonetheless, the rational expectations hypothesis was the benchmark from which to deviate.  
With respect to the fact that both new classical/RBC and new Keynesian macroeconomists 
assume  rational  expectations,  it  is  important  to  stress  that  there  was  a  domestication  of  this 
hypothesis by mainstream macroeconomists. Initially, in the 1970s, the new classical economists 
were known as “rational expectationists” (only later were they labeled “new classical”) and the 
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rational expectations hypothesis was understood to make economic policy ineffective (i.e., only 
policy  surprises  could  affect  real  variables  like  output).  This  ineffectiveness  went  against  the 
Keynesian understanding that stabilization policies can be used systematically over the cycle, which 
made Keynesians oppose rational expectations initially.  
The identification of rational expectations with policy ineffectiveness occurred not only in 
academia but also appeared in magazines like Business Week and Newsweek. On November 8, 1976 
(p. 74), Business Week published an article titled “How Expectations Defeat Economic Policy,” 
which  started  by  announcing  that  “a  controversial  new  theory  called  rational  expectations  is 
sweeping through the economics profession. It says that economic policy is impotent” because “the 
public…takes actions that offset [systematic policy changes].” The article continued by stating that 
“the work of ivory-towered economists Robert E. Lucas Jr. of the University of Chicago and Neil 
Wallace  and  Thomas  Sargent  of  the  University  of  Minnesota  is  giving  [Milton]  Friedman’s 
[critique of policy fine-tuning] something it lacked for two  decades—a solid theoretical  base.” 
Moreover, the article explained that monetary policy is where “the rationalists are making major 
breakthroughs:” for it to generate real effects it “must come from out of the blue.…Says Lucas: ‘To 
affect real output, the monetary authorities must resort to trickery, and how long can you keep 
pulling that off?’ And Wallace adds: ‘For countercyclical policy to work, it must surprise people, 
and  that’s  not  a  policy,  that’s  throwing  dice.’…Throwing  dice  is  a  dangerous  game.…[that] 
increases  uncertainty.  Uncertainty  damps  economic  activity.”  The  article  also  featured  the 
dissenting voices of the time, such as those of Benjamin M. Friedman (Harvard University), Robert 
E. Hall and Franco Modigliani (MIT), who argued that it takes time for people to adjust their 
expectations, which means that monetary policies have real effects in the short-run. They agreed 
with  “rationalists”  on  some  issues,  but  did  not  accept  that  the  monetary  effects  would  be 
incorporated  into  prices  fully  and  instantaneously.  “Minnesota’s  Sargent  and  Wallace  remain 
unconvinced. They maintain that time lags in the system are a thin reed on which to hang the 
success of stabilization policy.” Finally, monetarist Allan H. Meltzer argued for requiring more 
empirical evidence before, according to his own words, “we can know that rational expectations 
cripple stabilization policy.” It is important to note that Lucas was pleased with this article.46 
About two years later,  Newsweek  (June  26,  1978)  featured  an  article  titled  “The  New 
Economists,” which started: “Most of their names are still obscure, and their work is little known to 
the public. But in scholarly crannies across the country, a new breed of economists is emerging.” It 
said that this new generation was then laying the intellectual foundations of a national political shift 
                                                            
46 Lucas wrote a letter to Seymour Zucker of Business Week showing his satisfaction with the published article:  based 
on “our long and (I thought) confusing conversations, I was dubious that anything coherent would emerge. The article 
was thus a pleasant surprise.” Letter from Lucas to Seymour, November 11, 1976, folder “Correspondence-1976,” Box 
31; Robert E. Lucas, Jr. Papers, Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University. P. G. Duarte  18 
to the right: “All of them are basically conservative, though some bristle at the label,” but “they are 
not necessarily conventional political conservatives. Instead they have been inspired by the seeming 
impotence  of  Keynesian  economic  theory.”  It  then  went  on  to  say  that  this  group  varies 
ideologically “from a variety of monetarism which spurns activist government intervention in the 
economy to a pragmatic ‘neoclassicism’ that accepts some government action but is profoundly 
critical of past policies.” The article then addressed the association of rational expectations to policy 
ineffectiveness: 
Thomas Sargent represents a more radical branch of the new economists. He and 
University of Minnesota colleague Neil Wallace, 38, both advisers to the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, and Robert Lucas, 40, of the University of Chicago, 
are part of the “school of rational expectations”—a monetarist branch that, says one 
economist, “out-Friedmans Milton Friedman.” In essence the rationalists maintain 
that the government is impotent in the economic sphere. 
Sheils and Thomas (1978, 59)47 
 
Another similar but shorter article was published in 1978 in the newspaper The Minneapolis 
Star, titled “Rational people may be economy’s thorn,” and collected by Lucas.48 The article started 
by asking: “Are you a rational person?” Then it explained the theory that “is almost embarrassingly 
simple:” the public anticipates a coming policy and acts in a way that eliminates its real effects; the 
final outcome is only a change in inflation. It adds:  
To call this conclusion radical is an understatement. It challenges views on how to 
run the  economy that have held  sway  in  this  country since World War  II. And 
adherence to those views is precisely why we have both high inflation and high 
unemployment, the rationalists hold. 
Greenwald (1978) 
 
Over time, the “sweeping implications” of the rational expectations hypothesis (Mankiw in 
Snowdon and Vane 1995, 52), as first believed, were dismissed.49 New Keynesians could then 
embrace the rational expectations cause more freely . Alan Blinder (1989, 104, emphasis added) 
nicely summarized this point: 
It took a while, and some help from  Fischer (1977) and Phelps and Taylor (1977), 
for the profession to get clear that rational expectations (RE) is an assumption about 
behavior which may be right or wrong but which is logically disconnected from the 
hypothesis that prices move instantly to clear markets. It is more from the latter than 
                                                            
47 Sargent and Lucas seemed to embrace fully this missionary activity of advocating rational expectations as the policy 
ineffectiveness result. It is interesting that this article in Newsweek was translated into Spanish and published in a 
newspaper (not identifiable), which Sargent sent to Lucas with the following undated note: “Dear Bob, I thought you 
might be interested in learning of Kareken and Wallace’s missionary activities. Tom” (folder “1978-2,” Box 30; Robert 
E. Lucas, Jr. Papers, Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University). 
48 Folder “Correspondence-1978-1,” Box 30; Robert E. Lucas, Jr. Papers, Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special 
Collections Library, Duke University. 
49 As Blanchard (1992, 123) put it in terms of his preferred understanding of fights and scientific progress: “Initial 
fights were about the appropriateness of the assumption of rational expectations, as the assumption seemed so damaging 
to mainstream macroeconomics. But, by the late 1970s, regrouping had occurred, and progress happened in two 
phases:” the integration of supply shocks and rational expectations, and an analysis of the structure of markets.  P. G. Duarte  19 
from  the  former  that  the  new  classical  economics  (NCE)  derives  its  distinctive 
implications [regarding policy ineffectiveness]. 
Separating  those  two  ideas  helped  spread  the  RE  gospel,  since  formal 
econometric tests of the joint hypothesis of RE and market clearing almost always 
rejected  it.  Most  economists  had  a  strong  suspicion  that  the  market-clearing 
hypothesis was the weak link in the partnership.50 
 
The hypothesis of rational expectations was one of a series of elements  shared by new 
classical/RBC  and  new  Keynesian  theorists  (others  were:  general  equilibrium  models, 
microfoundations,  a  representative  agent,  complete  markets  and  complete  information). 
Microfoundations was the game that the new Keynesians also wanted to play in order to resuscitate 
Keynesian  macroeconomics  by  supposedly  making  it  immune  to  the  Lucas  critique.  In  fact, 
Mankiw  (1992b)  wrote  about  “the  reincarnation  of  Keynesian  economics”  after  Lucas’s 
announcement that Keynesian economics was dead: 
From our current perspective, it is clear that this obituary was premature. Today 
Keynesian theorizing does not inspire whispers and giggles from the audience.…If 
Keynesian economics was dead in 1980, then today it has been reincarnated. 
…Yet one can say that the new classical challenge has been met: Keynesian 
economics has been reincarnated into a body with firm microeconomic muscle.  
Mankiw (1992b, 559-560, emphasis added) 
 
Not all new Keynesians took the call for microfoundations as a justification for the use of a 
representative agent in their general equilibrium models. Although the new Keynesian work that 
became part of the new synthesis (as the RBC counterpart) was characterized by that conceptual 
tool, there were members of this group who subscribed to microfoundations but were against a 
model with a representative agent in which “problems of coordinating prices and wages simply 
cannot be studied” (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1993, 42). These were new Keynesians, like Stiglitz, 
who  were  interested  in  studying  asymmetric  and  costly  information  and  associated  market 
failures.51 
Besides this, one might argue against the view that both groups (new classical/RBC and new 
Keynesians) shared important methodological elements  by noting that Mankiw (1985) and other 
new Keynesians made a static partial equilibrium analysis instead of using the general equilibrium 
models for which new classical and RBC theorists were well known . However, Mankiw (1985, 
536) explicitly mentioned that it was possible to construct simple general equilibrium models in 
which his results would not only hold but also  would  be more pronounced. Moreover, static 
analysis was just a first step in explaining how nominal rigidity worked in their models; such work 
was understood to be “largely complete” in the early 1990s (Ball and Mankiw 1994, 137) and the 
                                                            
50 Blinder would later repeat similar words in an interview with Snowdon (2001, 113). Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993, 
41) also observed that the policy ineffectiveness result depends on instantaneous market clearing rather than on rational 
expectations. 
51 See also Stiglitz (1992) for a thoughtful discussion of his views on microfoundations and asymmetric information.  P. G. Duarte  20 
challenge  of  the  new  Keynesians  at  the  time  was  to  construct  quantitative  general  equilibrium 
models in line with the RBC literature.52  
Those central elements common to both the new classical/RBC and the new Keynesian 
camps (rational expectations, general equilibrium monetary models, representative agent, complete 
markets and complete information)  allowed them to communicate, trade ideas and evidence, and 
negotiate new empirical findings. This way they resolved most of the previously listed points of 
disagreement that they then turned into core features of the new consensus macroeconomics. 
 
4  Trading in the Triangle and Synthesizing Macroeconomics 
In the early 1990s, the merger of the new Keynesian and RBC models into “some grand 
synthesis that incorporates the strengths of both approaches” was “just a hope.”53 By the end of that 
decade it was a reality. Goodfriend and King coined the term new neoclassical synthesis in 1997 
when such a synthesis was yet developing: “macroeconomics is moving toward a New Neoclassical 
Synthesis” (231).54 According to them, the main features of this new consensus macroeconomics 
were  methodological:  “the  systematic  application  of  intertemporal  optimization  and  rational 
expectations.” But the synthesis also “embodies the insights of monetarists…regarding the theory 
and practice of monetary policy” (232).55 
In  that  same  year  Robert  Solow,  John  Taylor,  Martin  Eichenbaum,  Alan  Blinder,  and 
Olivier Blanchard all tried to answer the question “is there a core of usable macroeconomics we 
should all believe in?”, which was the theme of a session at that year’s AEA meeting—with a clear 
emphasis on how models come into practice. Solow (1997, 230) asserted that part of the common 
core of macroeconomics consists of: (a) “trend movement [that] is predominantly driven by the 
supply side of the economy (the supply of factors of production and total factor productivity)” and 
that it is best analyzed “in some sort of growth model, preferably mine”;  and, (b) fluctuations 
around the trend that “are predominantly driven by aggregate demand impulses” best studied with 
“some model of the various sources of expenditure.” Solow recognized that there was some dissent 
from proposition (b). He explicitly denied the RBC explanation of fluctuations as supply-driven, 
                                                            
52 This was the opinion voiced by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993, 35) and Mankiw (in Snowdon and Vane 1995, 56). For 
Lucas (1998, 130-131), this challenge was still unsettled by the end of the 1990s. 
53 These are Mankiw’s words in an interview he gave to Snowdon and Vane in 1993, published later (Snowdon and 
Vane 1995, 60-61). 
54 Lucas (1998, 130) also saw the synthesis coming. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) observed that the resurgence of 
interest in monetary policy was based on both the consensus that empirically monetary policy affects the real economy 
and on an improvement in the theoretical framework used for policy analysis: one that “incorporated the techniques of 
dynamic general equilibrium theory pioneered in real business cycle analysis” together with “the explicit incorporation 
of frictions such as nominal price rigidities” (1661-1662).  
55 According to these authors, the new synthesis “inherits the spirit of the old, in that it combines Keynesian and 
classical elements” (232). The old was characterized by three principles, they argued: (i) give practical macro policy 
advice; (ii) short-run price stickiness is the major source of economic fluctuations; and, (iii) macro models need 
microfoundations.  P. G. Duarte  21 
and  then  commended  the  “flexible,  observant  members  of  the  real-business-cycle  school,  like 
Martin Eichenbaum and his coworkers” for opening up “the fabric of their underlying model so that 
it  will  allow—or  insist—that  demand-side  impulses  play  the  dominant  role  in  the  short-run 
macroeconomic  fluctuations.  Then  this  proposition  is  indeed  part  of  the  usable  core  of 
macroeconomics” and economists can thus discuss what is the best way to model such demand-side 
forces (230).56 Solow also voiced his disapproval for assuming rational expectations in modeling a 
short-run  equilibrium:  “I  can  see  a  role  for  rational  expectations  in  the  modeling  of  long-run 
equilibrium. In the short-run part of macroeconomics, the rational expectations hypothesis seems to 
have little to recommend” (231). He then recognized that his core of macroeconomics lacked  “real 
coupling between the short-run picture and the long-run picture” (231-2). 
Taylor (1997) defined macro as the study of both economic growth and fluctuations and 
identified a practical core in this field that “is having beneficial effect on macroeconomic policy, 
especially monetary economics” (233). He then listed five key principles of such a core: (1) long-
run growth depends on movements along as well as shifts of a production function (this principle 
corresponds to Solow’s proposition (a)); (2) there is no long-run trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment; (3) there is a short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment (rationalized 
either by new Keynesian sticky prices or by asymmetric information à la Lucas); (4) expectations 
matter because they are highly responsive to economic policy—he then stated that the rational 
expectations approach is “the most feasible empirical way to model this response” (234); and, (5) 
evaluating  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  required  thinking  in  terms  of  “a  series  of  changes  [in 
instruments] linked by a systematic process or a policy rule” (234).  
Blinder (1997) basically followed the line of Taylor and emphasized the utility of such a 
core in terms of policy analysis, “where contact with reality is a necessity” (240). Eichenbaum 
(1997) approached the question of the existence of a core in macroeconomics from the perspective 
of stabilization policy. He then stressed that macroeconomists converge mostly in terms of method. 
However, they also agree on principles such as those listed by Taylor: (1) “monetary policy is 
neutral in the long run”; (2) “persistent inflation is always a monetary phenomenon”; (3) “monetary 
policy is not neutral in the short run”; and, (4) “most aggregate economic fluctuations are not due to 
monetary policy shocks” (236). All these points are at the core of the new synthesis, as will be 
discussed  later.  Finally,  Blanchard  (1997a)  identified  only  two  propositions:  (1)  short-run 
movements in economic activity are driven by aggregate demand; and, (2) “over time, the economy 
tends to return to a steady-state growth path” (244). 
What I want to underline is that although many macroeconomists wanted to answer with an 
“unambiguous  yes”  the  question  of  the  AEA  session  (Blanchard  1997a,  244),  there  were  still 
                                                            
56 Eichenbaum received his PhD from the University of Minnesota in 1981, under Thomas Sargent (who received his 
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important differences in the key elements of the new consensus, as just discussed. Nevertheless, the 
majority of these economists agreed not only on the explicitly stated or implicit methodological 
elements  (dynamic  general  equilibrium  models  with  rational  expectations  and  a  representative 
agent),  but  also with  most  of the  central principles of such  a core of  usable macroeconomics. 
Among these, two are noteworthy: short-run fluctuations are demand driven; and real disturbances 
are  often  inefficient—with  the  degree  of  inefficiency  being  a  function  of  the  monetary  policy 
response  to  such  disturbances.  Thus,  monetary  policy  is  non-neutral  in  the  short  run  as  a 
consequence  of  nominal  rigidity.  Clearly,  the  original  advocates  of  RBC  models  could  not  be 
included in this discussion and provide policy recommendations because their model had no role for 
money. These models also treated short-run fluctuations as optimal supply-side adjustments that 
occur in an environment of flexible prices in which all markets clear.  
However, Solow was a dissonant voice in this group of people without considering himself 
an economist  outside the mainstream.57 The reason was his insistence, first,  on using different 
models for analyzing short and long-run movements in economic activity and, second, on rejecting 
use of the rational expectations hypothesis in short-run analyses. Later, he commented on Chari and 
Kehoe’s 2006 article (Solow 2008) and repeated his longstanding criticism of using a representative 
agent in macroeconomics. His comments were not well received by the authors:  
Solow eloquently voices the commonly heard complaint that too much of modern 
macroeconomics starts with a model with a single type of agent. In our response, we 
clarify that modern macroeconomics does not end there—and may not end too far 
from where Solow prefers.…Solow seems to think that using that sort of model 
requires ignoring all the rich heterogeneity which he sees in the modern economy. 
While that may have been true many years ago, today it is not. 
Chari and Kehoe (2008, 247).58 
 
By  the  turn  of  the  century  the  new  synthesis  more  clearly  was  a  reality.  According  to 
Stanley Fischer, one of the evolutions that characterized macroeconomics in the early 2000s and 
made  him  very  happy,  “is  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  the  great  split  between  freshwater  and 
                                                            
57 Before he raised once again his criticisms of modern macroeconomics for offering no guidance or insight about the 
recent crisis and the deep and prolonged recession that many developed countries experienced, Solow (2010, 1) 
explicitly warned: “Before I go on, there is something preliminary that I want to make clear. I am generally a quite 
traditional mainstream economist. I think that the body of economic analysis that we have piled up and teach to our 
students is pretty good; there is no need to overturn it in any wholesale way, and no acceptable suggestion for doing 
so.” 
58 In a recent survey, Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2009, 320) made a similar point: due to improvements in 
numerical methods and faster computers, macroeconomists were now able “to study rich heterogeneous-agent models.” 
They “reached several conclusions about the importance of including household heterogeneity in their models” (320). 
They recognized that “macroeconomics is expanding from the study of how average values for inputs…and outputs…of 
production are determined in equilibrium to the study of how the entire distribution of these variables across households 
is determined” (321). While this broad trend is observable (but leaving open the question of how much this route will be 
explored by many economists), Solow’s point is still valid because the consensus in macroeconomics is one in which 
the representative agent reigns to this day, despite Chari’s (2010, 3) opinion that “any claim that modern macro is 
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saltwater economics. Although the split is still evident, convergence is also clearly under way. And 
I think that is very healthy for the profession” (interview with Blanchard 2005, 257).  
It is important to keep in mind that macroeconomists from both camps, RBC/new classical 
and  new  Keynesian,  had  to  negotiate  theoretical  arguments  in  the  face  of  growing  empirical 
evidence. These negotiations led to a consensus. Clearly, negotiations can happen only among those 
who speak the same language and share core theoretical elements. Roughly, the new Keynesian 
camp  had  the  goal  of  building  dynamic  general  equilibrium  models,  then  typical  of  the  real-
business-cycle literature, with nominal rigidities and other market imperfections.59  
On the other hand, the  proponents of the RBC (and new classical) models were criticized 
empirically and had to handle growing evidence that monetary policy has real effects on the short-
run—implying that they had to go beyond their general equilibrium models with flexible prices and 
technology shocks.60 In fact, evidence on price stickiness  also came from  international data, as 
Krugman (2000, 39) noted: in the 1980s advanced countries reduced their inflation rates while they 
experienced wild fluctuations in nominal exchange rates and the implied co-movement of nominal 
and real exchange rates had to be explained by price stickiness in those countries.61 In the end, there 
was a significant change in attitude by some people in the new classical/RBC camp towards price 
stickiness: after all, they became more comfortable with considering price rigidities as important to 
fluctuations because they could discuss this issue in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. 62 
Therefore, we see that t he interplay of opposing forces on both sides was important in the 
construction of the new synthesis , as well as the existence of “moderates on both sides of the 
fence,” who  had done  “a little converging;  stridency  [came] from  the  extremes”  (Solow 2000, 
154).63 
                                                            
59 As a result of using dynamic general equilibrium models, these economists became more concerned over time with 
the discussions about commitment and credibility that they had inherited from the RBC literature. 
60 See for instance Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993, 39-41) and Hartley, Hoover, and Salyer (1997), as well as references 
therein for the major empirical criticisms of real business cycle theories. Sims (1992) challenged RBC modelers to 
reproduce the multivariate time series facts that he presented in the article and claimed that data are imposing 
theoretical changes (996). 
61 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chap. 9) for further discussion of price stickiness in international data and open 
economy models. 
62 As Hoover (2006, 144) noted, “even the founders of the new classical macroeconomics, such as Lucas and Sargent, 
have to come to see that the assumption of sticky prices is essential if models have any hope of capturing observed 
economic behavior.” However, in the 1970s and 1980s the attitude of most new classical/RBC macroeconomists was 
against price stickiness. As the Keynesian Alan Blinder (interview with Snowdon 2001, 124) pointed out: “The parts of 
macroeconomics that took off in the 1970s and 1980s were those based on denying sticky prices. The attitude of new 
classical and real business cycle theorists seemed to be…‘if you don’t have a coherent theoretical explanation of sticky 
prices then it cannot be true that prices are sticky’. Personally I found that approach unscientific.” Nowadays the often 
used Calvo price setting would hardly qualify as a “coherent explanation of sticky prices.” Even if we take into account 
that its use is justified for simplifying the model (because it reduces the number of state variables) and for delivering 
results similar to better models of price stickiness, the wide adoption of Calvo pricing in the consensus macroeconomics 
is a sign that the opposition to which Blinder referred really weakened over time. 
63 Solow (2000, 155) classified Christiano and Eichenbaum as moderate RBC macroeconomists: “My Reading is that 
the work of Christiano, Eichenbaum and others has moved in the direction of incorporating frictions and imperfections 
into the real business cycle framework. The result sounds a little more like the observed economy.” P. G. Duarte  24 
Many mainstream macroeconomists believe that the main advantage of such a synthesis is 
that it bridges “the methodological divide between microeconomics and macroeconomics, by using 
the tools of general equilibrium theory to model Keynesian insights,” in Woodford’s (2000, 29) 
words.  The  central  point  of  convergence  in  the  new  synthesis  was  methodological:  the  use  of 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that explain not only the evolution of the 
potential output over time as a mostly supply-side phenomenon, but also short-run and inefficient 
deviations of the actual output from its “natural” level (the level achieved if prices were flexible) 
that arise as a consequence of rigidity in wages and prices.64  
Another very  important methodological point of convergence  is the empirical approach  
macroeconomists now use. As previously argued, in the 1980s and early 1990s the real -business-
cycle theorists and the n ew Keynesians were  almost  in opposite camps: the former defended 
calibration methods and were against econometric estimation while the latter favored estimation 
methods.65  In the new synthesis no such divide exists. As  Chari and Kehoe (2008, 248) aptly 
described, modern mainstream macroeconomists have now a “big-tent approach to data analysis” 
through  which  they  “confront  both  the  micro  aspects  and  the  macro  implications  of  general 
equilibrium  models  with  data.”  Today  not  only  is  there  no  conflict  between  calibration  and 
estimation, but both strategies are used complementarily: current practice calibrates a subset of the 
parameters (those about which economists have more information) and estimates the remaining 
parameters via likelihood or Bayesian methods.66 
The other points of disagreement between RBC and new Keynesian economists  already 
mentioned were real versus nominal shocks as sources of fluctuations, the relevance of monetary 
policy,  and  the  assumption  of  flexible  or  sticky  prices  and  wages   (perfect  versus  imperfect 
competition). Just to give a more vivid example of how divided macroeconomists were at  one time 
about the sources of fluctuations, I take Lucas ’s insistence that money matters, contrary to what 
RBC  economists  would  advocate.  Lucas  (1998,  125)  classified  himself  as  an  “old-fashioned 
monetarist,” someone who assigns an important role to monetary forces in economic fluctuations. 
He then added, at the time a consensus had already emerged, that from an econometric perspective, 
money did not account for most fluctuations in the postwar period:  
There is the real business cycle theory which assigns no importance to monetary 
forces. This work has been hugely influential, on me as well as on others, although I 
                                                            
64 See Duarte (forthcoming) for a detailed discussion of DSGE models. 
65 With hindsight, Woodford (2000, 27) commented that “the rejection of traditional econometric methods by the early 
RBC literature has surely been overdone.” 
66 See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005, 15-17), who followed Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), for a 
description of the econometric methodology of calibrating a subset of parameters and estimating the others by 
minimizing the distance between the impulse response functions from the data and the model. Even though Bayesian 
methods in principle can be used to estimate all parameters of a model, in macroeconomics it still is common to 
calibrate a few parameters that are either hard to estimate or, more importantly, are not identified (see for instance 
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still  think  of  myself  as  a  monetarist.  Then  there  are  those  whom  Sargent  calls 
‘fiscalists’…Then there are old-fashioned monetarists, which is where I would class 
myself,  with  people  like  Friedman  and  Allan  Meltzer.…I  used  to  think  that 
monetary shocks were 90 per cent of the story in real variability and I still think they 
are the central story in the 1930s. But there is no way to get monetary shocks to 
account for more than about a quarter of real variability in the post-war era. At least, 
no one has found a way of doing it.67 
 
The  current  consensus  is  that  real  shocks  account  more  for  the  variability  of  major 
macroeconomic variables than monetary shocks: for example, Altig et al. (2005) showed that about 
28 percent of each of the variances of output, inflation and average hours worked is explained by 
real shocks in their model, while only 14 percent can be attributed to monetary policy shocks.68 
These numbers  can vary  from model to model   as there are still issues  regarding  the  proper 
identification of shocks but they give the general picture that real shocks are more important in 
terms of explaining the variance of real variables .69 Nonetheless, this result does not mean that 
monetary policy is irrelevant in explaining economic fluctuations, as stressed by Woodford (2009, 
11): not only the existence, uniqueness and stability of equilibrium depend on the policies designed, 
but  also  “the  equilibrium  effects  of  real  disturbances  depend  substantially  on  the  character  of 
systematic monetary policy.” Therefore, there is in principle scope for monetary policy design to be 
part of a stabilization program.  
Monetary  shocks  have  well  documented  effects  on  real  variables  in  the  short  run 
(Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1999). While they do not explain much of the variability in 
major real variables, they still are useful for discriminating among alternative models: nowadays it 
is  common  to  have  papers  introduce  all  kinds  of  rigidities  (such  as  habit  persistence  on 
consumption, price and wage rigidities, adjustment costs on investment, capital utilization, etc.) that 
serve to smooth the dynamic responses of aggregate variables after a monetary shock. This is done 
for the models to be able to reproduce the effects of a monetary policy shock identified in the 
data—so  it  is  not  properly  an  empirical  test  of  these  models  but  rather  a  reverse  engineering 
strategy  to  have  the  models  account  for  features  of  the  data  that  macroeconomists  consider 
relevant.70  
Therefore,  we  can  see  that  the  major  issues  that  formerly  divided  mainstream 
macroeconomists  no  longer  do  so.  Nowadays  a  consensus  also  has  emerged  among  these 
                                                            
67 In fact, this association of the new classical economics, particularly Lucas, with monetarism was part of an intense 
debate in the early 1980s. Hoover (1988, chap. 9), largely reproducing his 1984 article in the Journal of Economic 
Literature (vol. 22, no. 1), clarifies the relationship between monetarism and the new classical school and provides 
references to that earlier literature. 
68 It is interesting to notice the central role played by shocks in modern economics. Duarte and Hoover (2011) analyze 
how the meaning of shocks has transformed since the 1930s and how they are used nowadays to observe the business 
cycle phenomena. 
69 See Dupor, Han, and Tsai (2009), Canova and Sala (2009), and references therein.  
70 See Duarte (forthcoming). Blanchard (2009, 224) considered the strategy of uncritically introducing such features to 
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economists in terms of stabilization policies, as summarized by Eichenbaum (1997). The common 
principles  that  characterize  the  new  synthesis  and  the  fact  that  these  economists  believe  such 
principles make their models immune to the Lucas critique give them confidence to apply their 
models to policy analysis, especially to monetary policy. Woodford’s precise motivation in his 
2003 book was to show how economists can now discuss monetary policy in practice by drawing 
on theoretical principles of the new consensus macroeconomics.71 But Woodford (2003, 11-12) 
carefully stated that “no attempt is made to set out a model that is sufficiently realistic to be used for 
actual  policy  analysis  in  a  central  bank.  Nonetheless,  the  basic  elements  of  an  optimizing 
model…are ones that I believe are representative of crucial elements of a realistic model”—and 
these crucial elements include being free of Lucas’s 1976 curse, according to the author. As Hoover 
(2006,  146)  argued,  mainstream  economists  like  Woodford  present  here  an  “eschatological 
justification”  for  constructing  simple  general  equilibrium  models  (with  a  representative  agent), 
which are used as guides for policymaking not because they provide an adequate description of the 
economy, but because they are seen as “the starting point for a series of fuller and richer models 
that eventually will provide the basis for” such an adequate description. 
Going  beyond  Woodford’s  (2003)  simple  model,  Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and  Evans 
(2005), and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) enriched the basic model in several dimensions to 
make  it  replicate  features  of  the  data  that  mainstream  macroeconomists  consider  important  (as 
already  mentioned,  these  features  are  usually  summarized  in  impulse  response  functions  to  a 
monetary policy shock, but there are correlations among variables as well). Both the basic and the 
larger models are based on representative households and firms. Although there are two types of 
firms  (one  that  produces  an  intermediate  good  and  one  that  assembles  the  final  good),  and  a 
continuum of intermediate firms (each producing one of the infinite number of intermediate goods), 
heterogeneity  plays  no  substantial  role  in  these  models.72  By  expanding  the basic model and 
enriching its dynamics, those authors  presented the clearest incarnations of quantitative general 
equilibrium models oriented to policy applications typical of the new synthesis.  
As  mentioned  in  the  introduction   to  the  present  essay ,  claiming  a  consensus  in 
macroeconomics—a field often seen as composed of rival schools—has the advantage of making 
the  case  for  both  academic  cohesion  and  scientific  progress,  as  well  as  for  a  unified  body  of 
knowledge from which to prescribe policies. In his comments regarding Goodfriend and King’s 
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Woodford’s (2006) own comments on these papers. 
72 Hoover (2006, 145) stated that although these models have “a measure of stylized heterogeneity...there is no agent-
by-agent modeling of the sort that would really qualify as microeconomics.” Besides this, the central point is that the 
focus of the consensus model is on the symmetric equilibrium in which intermediate firms only differ because they do 
not charge the same price, and in which the dispersion of the relative price does not affect the dynamics of the variables 
because these models are usually solved with first-order approximation methods (and price dispersion has an effect that 
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1997 article, Blanchard (1997b) questioned both the labels “new” and “synthesis” on the grounds 
that the principles behind such a synthesis were always part of macroeconomics—later he explicitly 
elaborated on his view that the history of macroeconomics in the twentieth century is not a “series 
of battles, revolutions and counterrevolutions,” which suggests that the field starts anew “every 
twenty years or so” and has “little or no common core,” but is rather a history of “a surprisingly 
steady  accumulation  of  knowledge”  (Blanchard  2000,  1375).73  According  to  the  author, 
macroeconomists  differ  in  the  weights  they  attach  to  the  different  ingredients  of  their  models 
(intertemporal optimization, nominal rigidities, and imperfect competition), but they live in the 
same world, which he described as being like a triangle: 
Think of a triangle. At the top is the Ramsey-Prescott model, with its emphasis on 
intertemporal choice. At the bottom left is the Taylor model, with its emphasis on 
nominal rigidities. At the bottom right is the Akerlof-Yellen model, with its focus on 
imperfections in the goods and the labor markets. Most of us live somewhere in the 
triangle. So do Goodfriend and King. Seen in this light, “new” and “synthesis” may 
be both a bit of an overstatement. 
Blanchard (1997b, 290). 
 
Blanchard’s triangle is indeed very useful for my point here: that the synthesis emerged 
from a trading among economists working in a narrowly defined area, one in which a representative 
agent was often assumed to answer the Lucas critique in their dynamic general equilibrium models 
based on optimizing individual agents. Questions about the non-neutrality of money in the long run, 
the  appropriate  type  of  microfoundations,  non-market  clearing  models,  and  the  limitations  of 
assuming a representative agent, for example, are simply not in that triangle and thus,  are not 
central to the new synthesis. In this sense it is not surprising that Leijonhufvud’s concern with the 
ability of a market economy to coordinate the economic activities of decentralized agents, and his 
“corridor hypothesis,” which states that the market mechanism generates coordination only within 
certain limits but not outside these limits (Leijonhufvud 1973), are both outside the triangle. As he 
later explained his opposition to Lucas’s resolution of the tension between micro and macro:  
That cut the Gordian knot, all right. But why was this path not taken before? Let me 
give a personal answer: because macroeconomics (I thought) is about system co-
ordination, and one should not adopt a method that threatens to define away the 
main  problem.  The  New  Classical  economics  has  the  priorities  the  other  way 
around—and  carrying  through  from  individual  optimizing  behaviour,  it  all  but 
eliminates the co-ordination problem. 
Leijonhufvud (1992, 28-29) 
 
And he adds that since publishing his 1973 paper, he became interested in behavior outside 
the  corridor  and  in  understanding  agents’  behavior  as  the  search  for  or  computation  of  an 
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macroeconomics of the 1970s had exploded and converged to the new synthesis, as previously mentioned. He then 
wrote: “Not everything is fine. Like all revolutions, this one has come with the destruction of some knowledge, and 
suffers from extremism, herding, and fashion. But none of this is deadly. The state of macro is good” (2). P. G. Duarte  28 
equilibrium price vector  (instead of knowing it, as  in  a Walrasian  general  equilibrium model). 
Because of his interests, he became a macroeconomist outside Blanchard’s triangle: 
Since that time, I have been particularly interested in ‘out-of bounds’ behavior, i.e., 
in  what  happens  in  economics  under  extreme  conditions:  hyperinflations,  great 
depressions, transformation from socialism.… 
My  disenchantment  with  this  [Lucas’s]  brand  of  microfoundations…was 
such that, to be frank, I drifted out of the professional mainstream from the mid-70s 
onwards, as intertemporal optimization became all the rage. 
Leijonhufvud (1993, 8, 11) 
 
Not  surprisingly,  Leijonhufvud  (2004,  139)  saw  the  new  neoclassical  synthesis  as  an 
enterprise that misses the crucial elements of how the economy works: 
Conceptually,  the  recent  trend  you  mention,  the  so-called  new  neoclassical 
synthesis, reminds one of the discussions that took place in the 1920’s and early 
1930’s. It’s classical economics with frictions. Again we have come full circle. But 
few economists these days want to think or talk about the corridor problem. 
 
It is curious that Blanchard (1997b) chose a triangle to summarize the core elements behind 
macroeconomics  and  the  new  synthesis  because  it  parallels  a  common  manner  by  which 
microeconomists geometrically represent preferences under uncertainty in the case of lotteries with 
three possible outcomes: the so-called simplex has at each vertex a lottery in which one outcome is 
certain  and  the  other  two  have  zero  probability;  macroeconomists  of  the  new  consensus  have 
theoretical preferences over a two dimensional simplex, Blanchard’s triangle. 
However, the existence of a consensus in mainstream macroeconomics does not mean either 
that even within such a triangle macroeconomists do not disagree or that they are not trying to 
reshape their space and transform  the triangle  into a geometric figure  with  more vertices.  The 
dissent inside the triangle relates to two major points: first, that the new consensus models are not 
yet ready for policy analysis because they introduce many shocks that are not invariant to policy 
(Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2009);74and, second, that the development of macroeconomics since 
the 1970s has emphasized mostly theoretical issues at the expense of practical ones. Therefore, the 
recent theoretical developments have had little effect on macroeconomists in charge of conducting 
actual  economic  policies .  In  other  words,  macroeconomists  privileged  the  development  of 
macroeconomics more as a science, devoted to “understand how the world works” (Mankiw 2006, 
29-30), than as a type of engineering, concerned with solving practical problems.75 
                                                            
74 These authors strengthened their criticisms by questioning the existence of a broad consensus in macroeconomics in 
the opening paragraph: “Viewed from a distance, modern macroeconomics, whether New Keynesian or neoclassical, 
are all alike.…Viewed up close, however, we disagree considerably” (242). 
75 Mankiw (2006) here reiterated and updated a concern already present in his 1990 article (repeated in his 1992a 
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In terms of expanding the triangle or transforming it into a polyhedron, macroeconomists 
living in the triangle have their lists of improvements ready.76 Chari and Kehoe (2006, 21-6), in a 
more standard RBC vein, listed: (1) work more on labor market rigidities; (2) incorporate the idea 
that differences in taxes are a key source of the differences in the labor markets in Europe and the 
US; and, (3) introduce unemployment benefits to understand differences in unemployment between 
countries.  
Mishkin  (2007,  27 -30)  went  in  the  direction  of  improvements  to  make  monetary 
policymaking a science more than an art: (1) enrich estimated DSGE models so as to make them 
more realistic in the eyes of central bankers; (2) improve or extend the way nominal rigiditi es are 
usually incorporated into such models; (3) move from models with  a representative agent to ones 
with heterogeneity of agents; (4) incorporate (and understand better the role of) financial frictions; 
(5) go beyond rational expectations and embed behavioral economics in macroeconomics; (6) 
introduce learning into  macro models;  and,  (7) keep  a  sense  of  art in monetary policymaking 
because economists “can never be sure what is the right model of the economy” (30).  
Galí and Gertler (2007, 41-3) echoed the aim to make “the model more realistic, by adding a 
variety of features that are likely to enhance its fit of the data” (41), and listed as new directions of 
research: (1) substitute Calvo’s time-dependent pricing scheme, in which the timing of adjustment 
of prices is exogenous, by state-dependent pricing that makes that timing depend on the endogenous 
evolution of the economy; (2) incorporate labor market frictions that help economists account for 
the observed fluctuations in employment and job flows; and, (3) abandon the complete markets 
hypothesis and introduce financial market imperfections. To Galí and Gertler’s points (2) and (3), 
Blanchard (2009, 216-22) argued that macroeconomists should answer questions of how markups 
move, in response to what, and why. He also repeated Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan’s criticism that 
several shocks in a DSGE model may not be invariant to the policy adopted—but he, in contrast to 
them, proposed the use of less structural approaches—and urged economists to pay more attention 
to the role of anticipations, suggesting a departure from rational expectations.  
Before concluding this section I would like to discuss in more detail the major criticisms 
that  Solow  raised  regarding  the  new  synthesis  in  general  and  regarding  the  idea  that  modern 
macroeconomics has changed for the better because it is now “firmly grounded on the principles of 
economic theory” (Chari and Kehoe 2006, 3). Solow (2008) commented on Chari and Kehoe’s 
2006 article that started, according to him, with a self-congratulatory phrase and with a statement 
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and Sawyer (2008). The literature critical on the use of a representative agent in macroeconomics is extensive. See 
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about macro having firm microfoundations. To Solow, the last sentence was “simply false” (243). 
He then criticized consensus macroeconomics through Chari and Kehoe’s positions: 
When  Chari  and  Kehoe  speak  of  macroeconomics  as  being  firmly  grounded  in 
economic theory, we know what they mean. They are not being idiosyncratic; they 
are  speaking  as  able  representatives  of  a  school  of  macroeconomic  thought  that 
dominates many of the leading university departments and some of the best journals, 
not  to  mention  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Minneapolis.  They  mean  a 
macroeconomics  that  is  deduced  from  a  model  in  which  a  single  immortal 
consumer–worker–owner maximizes a perfectly conventional time-additive utility 
function over an infinite horizon, under perfect foresight or rational expectations, 
and in an institutional and technological environment that favors universal price-
taking  behavior.  In  effect,  the  industrial  side  of  the  economy  carries  out  the 
representative consumer–worker–owner’s wishes. It has been possible to incorporate 
some frictions and price rigidities with the usual consequences—and this is surely a 
good thing—but basically this is the Ramsey model transformed from a normative 
account of socially optimal growth into a positive story that is supposed to describe 
day-to-day behavior in  a modern industrial capitalist  economy.  It  is  taken as  an 
advantage that the same model applies in the short run, the long run, and every run 
with no awkward shifting of gears. And the whole thing is given the honorific label 
of “dynamic stochastic general equilibrium.” 
Solow (2008, 243) 
 
Solow  was  explicit  about  not  being  against  the  idea  that,  as  a  first  approximation, 
“individual agents optimize as best they can,” which does not imply that the whole economy “acts 
like  a  single  optimizer  under  the  simplest  possible  constraints”  (244).  He  stressed  that  the 
Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu  theorems  establish  that  “the  only  universal  empirical  aggregative 
implications of general equilibrium theory are that excess demand functions should be continuous 
and homogeneous of degree zero in prices, and should satisfy Walras’ Law.” Many macro models, 
Solow  continued,  can  satisfy  these  requirements  “without  imposing  anything  as  extreme  and 
prejudicial as a representative agent in a favorable environment” (244). In addition to retaking his 
preferred view on macroeconomics already sketched in his presentation at the 1997 AEA Meeting 
(stressing his preference for small, tailored, partial equilibrium models), Solow (2008, 245) came up 
with this irony: 
I suppose it could also be true that the bow to the Ramsey model is like wearing the 
school colors or singing the Notre Dame fight song: a harmless way of providing 
some  apparent  intellectual  unity,  and  maybe  even  a  minimal  commonality  of 
approach.  That  seems  hardly  worthy  of  grown-ups,  especially  because  there  is 
always  a  danger  that  some  of  the  in-group  come  to  believe  the  slogans,  and  it 
distorts their work. 
 
As already mentioned, Chari and Kehoe responded only to Solow’s criticisms that they 
considered  to  be  of  substance.77  They  recognize d  that  the  challenges  facing  modern 
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macroeconomics are not small but rejected Solow’s criticisms of the use of a representative agent 
and of their claim that macroeconomics is now firmly grounded in economic theory. With respect to 
the  representative  agent  hypothesis,  Chari  and  Kehoe  (2008,  247)  stated  that  modern 
macroeconomics does not end with such a hypothesis, and in fact it does not end “too far from 
where Solow prefers. Most of macroeconomic research over the last 20 years has precisely been 
about incorporating the heterogeneity and the rich interactions that Solow seems to think it needs.” 
They argued that macroeconomists just start with a representative agent and then enrich the model 
“with the detail necessary to answer the question at hand” (248). They also criticized Solow for the 
use in his growth papers of a single production function with aggregate labor and stock of capital, 
with which “he sacrificed realism for an abstraction that has proven [sic] invaluable” (247).  
In  relation  to  Solow’s  point  about  aggregation  and  the  Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu 
implications, Chari and Kehoe (2008, 248) evaded the aggregation problem:  
Solow’s argument is based on an appeal to the Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu result, 
which  implies  that  if  we  have  only  aggregate  data,  then  theory  imposes  little 
discipline  on  how  we  model  aggregates.  Fortunately  for  macroeconomics,  the 
Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu  result  notwithstanding,  discipline  is  available 
elsewhere. If we have microeconomic data on how individual households and firms 
behave, then theory imposes discipline on the behavior of aggregates over and above 
Walras’ Law and zero-degree homogeneity.  
The  way  macroeconomists  use  microeconomic  data  to  discipline  their 
models is still developing. 
 
The  debate  between  Solow  and  Chari  and  Kehoe  illustrates  that  macroeconomists  can 
disagree  more  widely  when  they  distance  themselves  a  bit  from  the  narrow  definition  of 
macroeconomics aptly captured by Blanchard in his triangle, which is grounded on Lucas’s call for 
microfoundations and the use of the representative agent apparatus, among other things. 
 
 
5.  Some Final Thoughts 
Nowadays, mainstream macroeconomists assert that there is a methodological consensus in 
their field to the extent that “there are really no longer alternative approaches to the resolution of 
macroeconomic issues,” as Woodford (2009, 274) argued. The new consensus is perceived to have 
promoted  a  greater  merging  than  the  “old”  neoclassical  synthesis—an  idea  reinforced  by  De 
Vroey’s  (2004,  75-76)  observation  that  the  old  one  was  not  truly  a  synthesis  but  rather  “a 
metaphorical  compromise  between  two  approaches  that  did  not  want  to  enter  into  an  open 
intellectual fight.” 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
NBER Working Paper (13655, Nov. 2007), which had as its title “The heterogeneous state of modern macroeconomics: 
A reply to Solow.” The reply was later published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives without a title.  P. G. Duarte  32 
One  may  wonder  whether  defining  a  common  area,  Blanchard’s  triangle,  in  which 
macroeconomists could trade and narrow disagreements, implies a synthesis by definition, since it 
leaves outside the triangle those who disagree more widely.  There is even something stronger: 
defining  macroeconomics  by  that  area  implies,  therefore,  that  dissenters  are  either  not 
macroeconomists or not scientists to begin with. That was the case of Leijonhufvud, just to give one 
example, as I argued earlier: disenchanted with intertemporal optimization of rational agents, he 
drifted away from mainstream macroeconomics. But what is interesting from a historical point of 
view, as I have tried to argue, is that the definition of that common area is not immutable and that it 
left some room for disagreement. 
It is tempting to consider the role of MIT in promoting the new synthesis. Paul Samuelson 
had announced in the second edition (1951) of his bestselling textbook Economics that economists 
had worked toward a synthesis. But it was in its third edition (1955) that he coined “one of the most 
famous phrases in the history of macroeconomics” (Pearce and Hoover 1995, 202): the neoclassical 
synthesis. The old synthesis vanished with the new classical conquest of macroeconomics in the 
1970s and 1980s and nowadays we are back to a synthesis, the new neoclassical one. Although this 
term was first used by Goodfriend and King (1997), the idea of a new synthesis was welcomed in 
print by economists like Blanchard, Woodford, Mishkin, Romer and Galí and Gertler (and Mankiw 
and  Fischer  in  interviews).  All  these  enthusiasts,  except  Gertler,  obtained  their  PhDs  at  MIT: 
Blanchard,  Mishkin,  Romer  and  Mankiw  were  all  advised  by  Stanley  Fischer,  while  Galí  was 
advised by Olivier Blanchard, and Woodford by Robert Solow (officially, by Tim Kehoe de facto). 
On the other hand, the group of adherents to the new synthesis went beyond MIT graduates and 
included  people  like  Goodfriend  (Brown  University),  King  (Brown  University),  and  Gertler 
(Stanford University). It is indeed hard to strongly indentify the new synthesis with MIT, as was the 
case with the old neoclassical synthesis. Nonetheless, the fact that Blanchard and Woodford (and 
later Galí) were the leading writers of narratives about the evolution of the new synthesis and that 
they both studied at MIT has nice connotations that suggest that they are perhaps the Samuelsons of 
the new synthesis, even if unintentionally. 
As I have tried to show in this essay, the acceptance of the idea of a synthesis did not mean 
that mainstream macroeconomists all had the same view and all agreed about which policies to 
prescribe. The somewhat nuanced views that these economists have about such a consensus reflect 
a deeper understanding about how their field evolves. Having a synthesis is so much valued by 
them  because  they  see  that,  in  contrast  to  microeconomists,  they  work  on  a  battlefield,  with 
alternative  schools  constantly  debunking  one  another.  A  synthesis  is  understood  by  them  as 
implying that the fights are over—similar to Samuelson’s view of the old neoclassical synthesis, 
when “90 per cent of American economists have stopped being ‘Keynesian economists’ or ‘anti-P. G. Duarte  33 
Keynesian economists’” (Samuelson 1955, 260)—and that knowledge progresses at a faster rate. 
Consequently, a narrative of consensus is a way of boosting credibility, both in academia and in the 
policymaking arena: if you tell the story of a synthesis that merges the strengths of the competing 
schools that preceded it, how can one oppose the view that the synthesis means progress? 
With respect to the views these macroeconomists have about their field, while some favor 
the  notion  of  revolutions  and  counter-revolutions  and  others  deny  it,  all  seem  to  see 
macroeconomics progressing over time, with knowledge accumulating and improving.78 Moreover, 
implicitly or explicitly, most accounts are centered on internal progress: new theories improving on 
older ones by fixing logical and empirical flaws. Empirical facts are central to the construction of a 
synthesis because they do not go away, as Blanchard said, and therefore they force economists to 
change their theories and views in order to account for them. Mainstream macroeconomists see the 
merging of the new classical/RBC  and new Keynesian theories as driven by facts: a fight of 
convincing RBC followers that prices are sticky and that monetary policy matters in the short run. 
This was possible because both camps shared important methodological and theoretical convictions: 
they both distinguished rational expectations from the policy ineffectiveness result ; they took up 
Lucas’s microfoundational program; and they both, over time, leaned toward quantitative general 
equilibrium models (usually with a representative agent) that were typical of the RBC approach.  
Mankiw  (2006),  however,  favored  a  bit  broader  understanding  of  the  evolution  of 
macroeconomics  by  stressing  that  the  field  has  a  dual  role,  as  previously  mentioned: 
macroeconomics as science, concerned with understanding how the world works, and as a type of 
engineering that solves practical problems.79  
While Blanchard (2009) at once cast the new synthesis as a revolution with a mild Kuhnian 
flavor, Mankiw (2006, 39) preferred to see it as a truce: 
It is tempting to describe the emergence of this consensus as great progress. In some 
ways, it is. But there is also a less sanguine way to view the current state of play. 
Perhaps what has occurred is not so much a synthesis as a truce between intellectual 
combatants, followed by a face-saving retreat on both sides. Both new classicals and 
new Keynesians can look to this new synthesis and claim a degree of victory, while 
ignoring the more profound defeat that lies beneath the surface. 
 
There  is  some  truth  in  Mankiw’s  truce:  while  the  new  neoclassical  synthesis  can  be 
identified with the new Keynesian macroeconomics to the extent that most RBC models are simply 
silent  about  monetary  policy,  RBC  followers  make  the  case  that  the  new  consensus  is  just  a 
convergence to the use of dynamic general equilibrium models and to “policy recommendations 
                                                            
78 Transposing Weintraub’s (1979, 6) words to this context, mainstream economists need to guarantee that progress and 
synthesis are logically possible in order to look to the past and tell stories of progress and synthesis in their field: 
“Writing doctrinal history with an eye to progress and synthesis becomes difficult if progress was absent and synthesis 
is logically impossible.” 
79 Goodfriend (2007) consciously tried to go beyond purely internal histories of macroeconomics by relating theoretical 
developments to historical events. Mishkin (2007) also went in the same direction. P. G. Duarte  34 
similar to those made by neoclassical economists like Lucas and Stokey 25 years ago” (Chari, 
Kehoe and McGrattan 2009, 265). Neither side is willing to accept that they had to concede and 
change their models since the models have failed in some dimension.  
 The differing views that mainstream macroeconomists have about the state of their field 
and about possible areas of improvement should not diminish the degree to which they converged 
methodologically in  studying fluctuations.  They all  analyze such phenomena  usually  through  a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a representative agent and nominal rigidities, 
firmly grounded in microeconomic principles. Moreover, several of them agree with Chari (2010, 
2) that “any interesting model must be a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. From this 
perspective,  there  is  no  other  game  in  town.”  Therefore,  he  continued,  “a  useful  aphorism  in 
macroeconomics is: ‘If you have an interesting and coherent story to tell, you can tell it in a DSGE 
model. If you cannot, your story is incoherent.’”80 
To historians of economics, not only is this consensus an interesting object of study but also 
the histories about its evolution that already have been produced, mostly by economists:81 such 
narratives illustrate that the history of macroeconomics can be  used purposefully to organize the 
present developments in ways  that  reaffirm the solidness of the new consensus and its policy 
prescriptions, despite the fact that macroeconomists  recognize that further work  is necessary to 
improve  the new consensus  even more. The challenge of a serious re cession  such  as the one 
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